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CHAPTER 1. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Improved scientific understanding of the natural world has led scientists to better 
comprehend the dynamic complexity and interrelationship of many environmental prob­
lems. A clear example of this evolution of understanding is the case of global warming 
and greenhouse gas emissions, where the best scientific consensus of the dynamic nature 
of the global warming problem and its ramifications is summarized in the third report of 
the International Panel on Climate Change in 2000. 
As the scientific understanding evolves, so too does environmental policy. Specifi­
cally, environmental economists and policy analysts continue to design and assess effi­
cient mechanisms that both address the inherent risks of environmental concerns, such as 
climate change, and are politically feasible. To accomplish these two objectives, econo­
mists need to understand and incorporate the complexities of the underlying science and 
policy concerns into the design and implementation of economic incentives. 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that address fundamental features of 
policy-relevant incentive design for complex environmental problems. In the first essay, 
I study the efficient design of policies for storing carbon (an important greenhouse gas) 
in agricultural soils. In the second essay, I consider the optimal intertemporal trading of 
emissions permits in the important case of asymmetric information and in the third, I 
focus on multiple policy goals, using the case of green payments as a case study. 
Although in each essay/chapter, a separate problem is addressed, the unifying theme 
of this thesis is the importance of understanding and incorporating both the relevant 
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scientific information about the fundamental aspects of an environmental problem and 
the goals of policy in designing incentives 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I investigate the design of efficient incentives 
for farmers to sequester carbon, that is, take carbon out of the atmosphere and store it 
in the soil. Carbon sequestration reduces the carbon stock in the atmosphere and thus 
may ameliorate global warming. The essay begins with an analysis of the dynamic path 
of carbon in the atmosphere and in the soil. The fact that carbon taken out of the 
atmosphere can later be released into the atmosphere almost costlessly plays a critical 
role in the design of mechanisms. In particular, in the absence of appropriate incentives 
farmers may release the carbon sequestered in their land, mechanisms must be carefully 
designed if farmers are to store carbon for the optimal length of time. 
In the third chapter, I consider the design of optimal intertemporal permit trading 
systems under asymmetric information. Regardless of whether the Kyoto Protocol or any 
other international treaty is ratified, it is likely that a market-based trading approach 
will be a part of any U.S. policy considered for global warming. In addition, emissions 
permit trading has been a part of policies addressing other environmental problems such 
as acid rain. The importance and potential for intertemporal trading has not been well 
addressed in the environmental economics literature. 
When there is asymmetric information, regulators have at least two choices to improve 
social welfare (relative to using standards or taxes): one is to give agents more flexibility, 
the other is to design mechanisms that properly separate agents with heterogeneous 
benefits or costs related to the externalities. When agents have more flexibility, social 
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welfare might be improved since agents know more than the regulators and thus are 
capable of making better decisions. A well-known application of this concept is to allow 
firms to trade emission permits. Typically, regulators do not know firms' abatement costs 
and so it is difficult, if not impossible, for the regulators to set the right standard for 
each firm. Permit trading enables firms to equate the marginal costs of abatement among 
themselves. Otherwise, firms with low abatement costs may emit more than those with 
high abatement costs, which is not efficient. 
However, there is a cost of allowing agents more flexibility if they disregard the exter­
nalities of their decisions. In the case of permit trading, if pollutants from each firm are 
uniformly mixed such that firms' emissions are perfect substitutes for each other, then 
trading among firms does not affect total damages of an externality. However, if one unit 
of emission from firm A produces more or less damage than that from firm B and firms 
trade permits at a one-to-one ratio, then total damages from emissions will differ from a 
no-trading situation, even though total emissions remain the same. In such a case, the 
flexibility of trading has two effects: it saves abatement costs for firms but it also may 
generate additional social damages. The efficient degree of flexibility in this case will 
depend on the trade-off. In the third chapter, I study this trade-off in the context of 
intertemporal permit trading. 
The second approach to dealing with asymmetric information draws from the large 
literature on designing mechanisms to separate agents. The basic idea is to design in­
centive compatible mechanisms under which agents of a certain type find it optimal to 
behave as their own type. For example, different farmers may have different costs of pro­
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viding environmental services such as adopting conservation tillage and reducing fertilizer 
usage. If the government is to purchase these services at at least cost, then farmers with 
low costs will be paid less than those with high costs. However, this is often infeasible 
either because the costs of providing such services are private information or because it 
is not "fair" to pay farmers differently for the same amount of services. Thus, proper 
mechanisms have to be used to induce farmers to reveal their true type by self-selection. 
The design of such mechanisms becomes more complicated if the government also wants 
to make positive net transfers (over and above farmers' conservation costs) to a certain 
group of farmers. 
In the fourth chapter, this issue of asymmetric information and dual policy goals in 
the context of green payments, i.e, paying farmers for the provision of environmental 
goods is studied. In discussions of the next farm bill, interest in green payments has 
been high for two reasons. First, in recent years, the public has become increasingly 
aware of agriculture's multiple outputs. Agriculture not only produces food and fiber, 
it affects water quality, provides wildlife habitat, and may contribute to solving global 
warming. Paying farmers to provide these environmental goods can make economic sense. 
Second, green payments may be a vehicle for transferring income to the farm sector and 
thus replace traditional income support programs that distort production. The fourth 
chapter considers the efficient design of a green payments program in the presence of 
each of these complications. 
The last chapter provides general conclusions and discusses possible future areas of 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE TIME PATH AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF CARBON SEQUESTRATION 
A paper accepted by American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
Hongli Feng, Jinhua Zhao, Catherine Kling 
Abstract 
We develop a dynamic model to investigate the optimal time paths of carbon emis­
sions, sequestration and the carbon stock. We show that carbon sinks should be utilized 
as early as possible, and carbon flow into sinks should last until the atmospheric carbon 
concentration is stabilized. We rule out any cyclical patterns of carbon sequestration and 
release. We propose and assess three mechanisms to efficiently introduce sequestration 
into a carbon permit trading market: a pay-as-you-go system, a variable-length-contract 
system and a carbon annuity account system. Although the three mechanisms may not 
be equally feasible to implement, they are all efficient. 
Introduction 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries have pledged to reduce their car­
bon emissions to below their 1990 emission levels over the period 2008-2012. To fulfil 
their commitment, some countries, including the U.S., have proposed the inclusion of 
three broad land management activities pursuant to Article 3.4 of the Protocol, including 
forest, cropland and grazing land management.1 These activities can reduce atmospheric 
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carbon stock by sequestering, or removing, carbon from the atmosphere and storing it 
in soil or biomass. For land rich countries like the U.S., Canada and Russia, carbon 
sequestration by these activities could potentially account for significant their emission 
reductions. For example, estimates indicate that the total carbon sequestration potential 
of U.S. cropland through improved management is 75-208 MMTC/year (Lai et al). Soil 
sinks, combined with forest sinks, could potentially be used by the U.S. to meet half of 
its emission reduction commitment (USDOS). However, skepticism remains among en­
vironmental groups who argue that "While preventing the emission of carbon dioxide is 
permanent, sequestering carbon pollution is a cheap, short-term fix that fails to address 
a long-term problem" (WWF). 
The concerns raised by environmentalists and others relate specifically to the fact that 
sinks may be short run in nature and consequently, do not provide the same benefits as 
permanent emission reductions. This non-permanence issue is one of the focal points in 
post Kyoto negotiations on carbon sinks (IPCC, 2000a),2 and disagreement over sinks was 
a major impediment to progress at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Hague in November 2000 (IISD).3 
At the heart of the debate lie two inter-related difficulties of carbon sinks due to the 
non-permanence feature. The first difficulty has to do with accounting and implementa­
tion. If sequestered carbon can be easily released, governments must find ways of properly 
accounting for the "net value" of possibly temporary storage, and design mechanisms to 
implement carbon sinks that correctly reflect this value. For example, if a permit trad­
ing system is devised for carbon abatement, which permanently reduces carbon released 
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into the atmosphere, the system cannot be directly applied to carbon sequestration if 
the sequestered carbon is only temporarily kept out of the atmosphere. The second is­
sue concerns when carbon sinks should be utilized. While the U.S., Canada and some 
other countries, arguing for cost effectiveness, prefer earlier inclusion, the EU has argued 
for later usage, stressing the key role of improving energy efficiency and shifting toward 
renewable energy resources. A related but deeper question is the optimal time path of 
carbon sequestration. Given that stored carbon can be easily released, thereby providing 
opportunities for future sequestration, the optimal time path may possibly have a cyclical 
pattern: sequestration and release, followed by sequestration and release, and so on. 
In this paper, we develop a stylized model of carbon emissions (or abatement) and 
carbon sequestration to investigate the optimal time patterns of sequestration, emissions 
and carbon stock, and to propose three mechanisms that can efficiently implement car­
bon sinks in a permit trading system based on emissions and abatement. We show that 
a cyclical pattern is not optimal for soil sinks. In particular, both carbon emissions and 
stock are monotone in time: depending on the starting carbon stock level, they either 
increase or decrease through time monotonically. There are two possibilities for seques­
tration, depending again on the starting point. In one scenario, carbon is sequestered first 
and partially released later. In the more realistic scenario, carbon is continually being 
sequestered, although eventually, approaching the steady state, the scale of additional 
sequestration goes to zero. In both cases, we find that, if sinks are to be used at all, we 
should start to use them now. 
We then propose three systems to implement the optimal sequestration levels: a 
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pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, a variable-length-contract (VLC) system, and a carbon 
annuity account (CAA) system. Each could be used in conjunction with a well func­
tioning (emission reduction based) carbon permit trading system to efficiently include 
the sequestration of carbon. We show that each system can be efficient, but requires 
different conditions to be so. Further, the systems are likely to differ in the transaction 
costs associated with their implementation. Consequently, one or more may be desirable 
in practice and under different circumstances. These systems also indicate the proper 
way of accounting for the value of (possibly temporary) sequestration. 
There are two studies in the literature on the optimal time patterns of carbon se­
questration and emission. Van Kooten et al. investigate optimal carbon sequestration 
for an exogenously given time path of emissions. Richards studies the optimal emission 
levels and carbon stock without explicitly introducing sequestration as one of the control 
variables. Our paper extends this literature by modeling emissions and sequestration 
simultaneously, and studies an optimal control problem of two state and two control 
variables. These complications are important since abatement and sequestration are two 
ways of reducing the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, and their optimal time 
paths are bound to be inter-dependent. 
A few studies have discussed various aspects of the implementation of carbon sinks. 
Recognizing the difference between abatement and sequestration, and between sequestra­
tion projects, Fearnside and Chomitz advocate a "ton-years" accounting method, which 
distinguishes between, say, one ton of carbon sequestered for one year and the same 
amount sequestered for five years. McCarl and Schneider, and Marland, McCarl and 
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Schneider, discussing soil carbon sinks, suggest that incentive programs for sequestration 
have to address the issue of "preservation of gains over time" or "longevity of agricultural 
carbon." Marland, McCarl, and Schneider, also argued that if sequestered carbon be­
comes a commodity, then credits could be issued for carbon sequestered but there must 
be subsequent debits if the carbon is later released. To our knowledge, our paper presents 
the first systematic study of the efficient implementation of carbon sinks that formally 
accounts for the non-permanence of sinks. 
Throughout the paper, we use the term "abatement" to refer to reductions in carbon 
loadings and "sequestration" to mean the storage of carbon in soils or terrestrial biosphere 
in general. Thus, abatement by its nature is permanent. If a ton of carbon is not produced 
and emitted into the atmosphere today, it will not be present in the atmosphere at a later 
date. In contrast, a ton of carbon stored in a sink today may be only temporarily out of 
the atmosphere as it might be released in a future period. 
An important issue that we do not address, but nevertheless provides the justification 
for this study, is the cost effectiveness of carbon sequestration compared with abatement. 
Stavins, reviewing a large body of the existing studies and providing his own analysis, 
argues that growing trees to sequester carbon has lower marginal costs than emission 
abatement for a considerable range of stored carbon. Antle et al., Pautsch et al., and 
Mitchell et al. assess the cost and potential of carbon sequestration by changing man­
agement practices within the agricultural sector. Although their results vary for different 
practices, all show there is economic potential for soil carbon sequestration. 
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Model Setup 
Consider the social planner's problem of maximizing the benefits of carbon emissions 
minus the cost of sequestration and the damage caused by global warming. Let e(t) be 
the society's emission rate at time t and B(e(t)) the benefits of emissions, with B(0) = 0, 
B'(-) > 0, B"(-) < 0, and lime_o B'(e) = oo. Higher emissions represent lower levels of 
abatement in the economy, and the benefits are equivalent to the saved abatement costs. 
The monotonicity and concavity of £(•) then is a result of the monotonicity and convexity 
of the abatement cost function (in the level of abatement)4. The marginal abatement 
cost approaches infinity if all of the society's emissions are to be abated, leading to the 
l a s t  cond i t i on  on  B( - ) . 5  
The emitted carbon accumulates in the atmosphere causing global warming effects. 
Let C(t) be the total carbon stock in the atmosphere. The pollution damage of the 
carbon stock is D(C(t)) with £>'(•) > 0 and D"{-) > 0. 
We assume that the carbon stock C ( t )  decays at an exponential rate 6  >  0. By decay 
we mean the process by which atmospheric carbon is "sunk" into the ocean. There is 
a constant process of carbon flow between the atmosphere and the ocean, the direction 
and speed of which depends on the temperature and carbon concentration in both media. 
Typically carbon flow is not exponential. Our assumption simplifies the model and 
captures the notion that carbon flow into the ocean increases as the carbon stock rises in 
the atmosphere. The assumption also indicates that carbon is not a pure stock pollutant, 
and theoretically, its concentration level can go down, and thus can be stabilized (through 
sequestration and reduced emissions). 
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Let A( t )  be the total units of land that are enrolled in carbon sequestration programs 
at time t. To simplify notation, we define one unit of land as the acreage that is needed 
to sequester one ton of carbon. For example, if one acre of land can sequester a tons of 
ca rbon ,  o n e  un i t  o f  l and  i s  eq u a l  t o  1 / a  ac r e s .  L e t  Q(A( t ) )  b e  t he  c os t  o f  en ro l l i ng  A( t )  
with Q'(-) > 0, Q(0) = 0 and Q"(-) > 0. The cost of carbon sequestration can be inter­
preted in two ways. If sequestration requires changing agricultural production practices, 
the cost may be the agricultural profit foregone for doing so. For example, switching 
from conventional to conservation tillage may reduce a farmer's profit (Pautsch et al., 
Antle and Mooney), and some amount of profit may also be lost if cropland is converted 
to forestland (Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller). In the case of improved management 
of an existing forest stand, the cost of carbon sequestration is the expenditure incurred 
to enhance management, e.g., fertilization (Hoen and Solberg, and Boscolo Buongiomo, 
and Panayotou). 
The cost function Q(-) can be convex for a variety of reasons. Different land may incur 
different sequestration costs: some highly productive land is best kept in conventional 
tillage and some land can be converted to forest without much economic loss. Typically, 
land with low sequestration cost is converted first. As the land area A increases, the cost 
Q(A) will increase at a faster rate when land of higher sequestration cost is converted.6 
Let A be the total land units. We assume that lim Q(A) = oc, implying that all land 
A—>Â 
will never be converted. 
Let a{ t )  be the units of land newly enrolled ( a ( t )  >  0) or withdrawn ( a ( t )  < 0) 
in period t. For simplicity, we assume that when land is newly enrolled, carbon is 
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immediately removed from the atmosphere, up to its full capacity (of one ton per unit). 
Likewise, all of the stored carbon is completely and immediately released if the land is 
converted back to its original use. In truth, soil carbon sequestration is a gradual process, 
and it may take up to fifty years for certain soil to reach its full sequestration capacity. 
Our assumption simplifies the model, and incorporates a key feature of sequestration: a 
piece of land can only hold a certain amount of carbon, all of which could be released 
back to the atmosphere during a very short period. To capture in a simple way the 
fact that there are costs (or physical limits) of converting land, we place bounds on the 
amount of land that can be converted each period: a < a(t) < a, with a < 0 and à > 0. 
The equations of motion for C{t) and A(t) are 
( 1 )  C ( t )  =  e ( t )  - a ( t )  - 6C( t ) ,  C (0 )  =  C 0  >  0, 
(2) À( t )  =  a( t ) ,  A(0) = A 0  > 0, 0 < A{ t )  <  À a  <  a( t )  <  a .  
Equation (1) indicates that the change in the stock of carbon each period equals new 
emissions less the amount sequestered and the amount of natural decay. Let r be the 
social discount rate. Then the social planner's net payoff function is 
(3) V°(A ,C , e , a )  =  f °  e~ r t [B (e ( t ) )  -  D(C( t ) )  -  Q( A ( t ) ) }d t .  
Jo  
Maximizing (3) subject to (1) and (2) yields the optimal carbon sequestration and emis­
sion levels over time. 
Optimal Paths of Sequestration and Emissions 
Since lim_Q(A) = oc, the constraint A( t )  <  Â  is never binding along the optimal path. 
A—A 
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So is the constraint A( t )  > 0, as we will show later (Remark 3). This observation 
is intuitive: since the marginal cost of sequestration Q'(A) is low when A is close to 
zero, and is typically lower than the marginal cost of emission reduction B'(e), it makes 
economic sense to use some sinks to store a positive amount of carbon. 
The current value Hamiltonian for the social planner's problem is 
(4) 
H{C,  A ,  e ,  a ,  A, //) = B(e ( t ) )  -  D(C( t ) )  -  Q(A( t ) )  
—A(£) [e(t) — a{ t )  — 6C( t ) \  — f i ( t ) a ( t ) ,  
where A( t )  and f i { t )  are the negative of the costate variables which are continuously 
differentiable, and are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable almost everywhere. 
The necessary conditions are 
dH (5) 
de  
= -A ( t )  +  B ' {e ( t ) )  = 0, or A ( t )  = B'(e(t)), 
(6) 
= a 
max H or a ( t )  < _  a  if A(t) — n ( t )  <  
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
G [ a ,  a ]  
dH  
> 0 ,  
< 0. 
= 0, 
A(£) — r \ ( t )  +  —  ( r  +  S)X( t )  — D ' (C( t ) ) ,  
BH 
î i ( t )  =  rn ( t )  +  —  = rn{ t )  -  Q'(A(<)), 
lim e r A( t )  =  0, lim e n ( t )  = 0. Î —*oo t,—*oo 
From (7) and (8), we know 
(10a) A(t) = £°° e-^^D'iCisVds, 
(10b) H( t )  ( A ( s ) ) d s .  
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Thus A(£) measures the total discounted (to period t )  future damages caused by one 
more unit of atmospheric carbon in period t. Notice the symmetric role played by the 
natural decay rate, 6, and the social discount rate, r. Equation (5) simply says that the 
marginal benefit of emitting one unit of carbon must equal its marginal cost. Similarly, 
fj.(t) measures the discounted costs of maintaining one unit of land in sequestration, and 
(6) indicates that land should be converted at its maximum speed whenever the benefit 
of land conversion A(t) is different from the cost This feature of land conversion is 
due  t o  t he  l i nea r i t y  o f  t h e  Ham i l t on i an  i n  a ( t ) .  
The Steady State 
We assume that a steady state exists (thus the transversal!ty conditions in (9) are natu­
rally satisfied). Later we will show that the steady state is a saddle point. Setting C — 0, 
À = 0, Â = 0 and fi = 0, from the conditions in (7) - (8) and the two state equations (1) 
- (2), we obtain the following description of the steady state: 
(«) e* = 6C% ( i i )  B'(e>^, (.«) A* = 
(11) z ^ r + 6 r + 6 
{ i v )  /i* = A* = -, and (?;) a* = 0. 
T 
The steady state levels of emission and stock e* and C* are uniquely determined 
by (11-i) and (11-ii), and are independent of the sequestration activities. In particular, 
they are independent of the cost of sequestration Q(-). That is, once the steady state 
emission and stock levels are attained, there is no role for additional carbon sequestration 
activities. In the very long run, emissions have to be kept at such a level that it is just 
offset by the reduction in carbon stock due to the natural decay. Thus, in setting the 
targets for the long-run control of global warming, the government only needs to consider 
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the costs and benefits of emission abatement and atmospheric carbon concentration. The 
option of carbon sequestration should not matter. 
However, from (11-iii) - (11-iv), we know A* > 0 and A*  > 0. Thus, a certain amount 
of carbon in fact is sequestered in the biomass in the steady state. This amount is higher 
if the marginal cost of sequestration Q'(-) is lower, or as the sequestration becomes more 
effective. Then the positive stock A* must be the result of using sequestration during the 
transition path toward the steady state. That is, sequestration does affect the process of 
reaching the long-run targets. We will investigate this process in the rest of this section. 
In summary, 
Remark 1 The long-run targets of controlling global warming are independent of the 
sequestration possibilities. That is, carbon sequestration cannot efficiently provide a long-
run solution to global warming on its own. However, it may be efficiently employed *in 
the process, " resulting in a permanent level of sequestered carbon. 
The Transition Paths 
Analyzing the transition paths of the system and the stability of the steady state is 
complicated because there are two state variables and the problem is singular in one 
of the control variables. In principle we have to study a system of four differential 
equations, and the Eigenvalues are difficult to characterize without assuming special 
functional forms for the cost and benefit functions. We develop an alternative method 
to  ana lyze  t he  s y s t em,  and  pa r t l y  r e l y  on  t he  (quas i )  phas e  d i ag rams  i n  t he  space  o f  e ( t )  
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and C(£), shown in Figure 1. Setting C = 0 in (1), we get 
(12) e(t) = a ( t )  +  6C( t ) .  
Thus the C = 0 locus is linear and upward slopping, and its location depends on the 
value of a(t). This locus is shown for three constant levels of a(t), ô, 0, and a, in Figure 
1. 
To derive the equation of motion for e ( t ) ,  we differentiate both sides of (5), and get 
(13) X( t )  =  B"{e{ t ) ) è { t ) .  
Plugging (5) and (13) into (7) and rearranging, we know 
(14) è ( t )  =  r + 6 D ' (C( t ) )  
r  +  6  
%(()) 
Setting è ( t )  = 0 leads to 
(15) D' jC j t ) )  
r  +  6  
Finally, totally differentiating equation (15), we obtain 
(16) de  D" ( C( t ) )  
dC  ( r  +  6)B" (e ( t ) )  < 0. 
Thus the é = 0 locus is downward slopping and is independent of the level of a ( t ) .  In 
Figure 1, from (13), we know é(t) < 0 when {C{t), e(<)} is to the left of the è = 0 locus, 
and  è ( t )  >  0  when  ( C( t ) ,  e ( £ ) }  i s  t o  t he  r i gh t ,  i ndependen t  o f  t h e  va lue  o f  a ( t ) .  
Figure 1 Here 
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The dotted lines with arrows in Figure 1 represent the stable and unstable branches 
of the system for fixed levels of a. It is obvious that when there is no or constant rate of 
sequestration, the system of e(t) and C(t) should approach the steady state on a saddle 
path. 
The derivation of the optimal paths (characterized in Propositions 1-5) when a ( t )  is 
endogenous is given in . Here we only present the results and discuss the intuition. The 
rate of sequestration a(t) is determined by (6). The system is thus on a singular path 
when A(t) = This path is important because it contains the steady state, which is 
associated with a < a(t) = 0 < â. 
Intuitively, once the system {C(£), A(t), e ( t ) ,  a(t)} reaches the singular path, it should 
stay on the path until the steady state is reached in the limit. The reason is that before 
t he  s i ngu l a r  p a th  i s  r e a c he d ,  t h e  ma rg ina l  be ne f i t  and  cos t  o f  s eq u es t r a t i o n  A ( t )  and  n ( t )  
are not equal. Thus land should be converted (either into or out of the sequestration 
programs) at the maximum rate in order to mitigate the inequality. Once they are equal, 
the social planner has no incentive to break the equality because any future inequality 
can be avoided by adjusting the conversion rate a(t) now while on the singular path to 
improve welfare. 
This intuition suggests that the transition path resembles a most rapid approach path, 
except that the system "quickly" approaches the singular path, rather than the steady 
state. Before the singular path is reached, a(t) equals either â or a. The values of e(t) and 
C(t) are then determined jointly by (1) and (14) with appropriate boundary conditions 
(discussed later). The following Proposition shows that our intuition is indeed correct. 
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Proposition 1 Given the starting point {Co, Aq}: the optimal path urill move to the 
s ingu la r  pa th  a s  soon  a s  p o s s ib l e ,  b y  s e t t i ng  a ( t )  t o  be  e i t he r  â  o r  a  and  choos ing  e ( t )  
accordingly. The system will then stay on the singular path forever, approaching the 
steady state. 
The proposition describes what happens before the singular path is reached, we next 
characterize the features of the singular path. 
Proposition 2 The land conversion rate on the singular path is given by 
_  - 6 ( r  + 6 )B ' ( e ( t ) )  +  SD ' (C( t ) )  +  D»(C( t ) ) ( e ( t )  -  6C ( t ) )  
°
U  Q"(A( t ) )  +  D"( C( t ) )  
As emissions, carbon stock and land stock A( t )  change overtime, the value of a ( t )  is 
likely to change as well. In fact, it is generic that a(t) is not a constant on any time 
interval on the singular path. This observation highlights the limitations of studying 
carbon emissions assuming fixed levels of sequestration. 
Next we show that the emission and carbon levels are monotonie. 
Proposition 3 Along the singular path, both e(t) and C(t) are monotone. That is, 
except at the steady state, neither é(t) norC(t) can be zero. 
The Proposition says that, if the steady state carbon stock level is lower (higher) than 
the starting level, then the carbon stock will increase (decrease) steadily through time. 
Since the damage function D(-) of the stock is convex, the planner has an incentive to 
"smooth out" C(t) overtime and avoid cyclical variations such as raising the stock for 
a while only to abate it later. Similarly, the benefit function of B(e) is concave, and 
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emission smoothing implies monotone e ( t ) .  The Proposition implies that depending on 
the starting point, the transition path can only stay on one side of the isocline é = 0 in 
Figure 1 (recall that é(t) is a function of e(t) and C(t) only). The next Proposition shows 
that, under a certain condition, A(t) is monotone as well, i.e., a(t) does not change signs 
on the singular path. 
Proposition 4 A(<) is monotone along the singular path if and only if 
(18) A (t) /X(t) < r. 
When (18) is satisfied, if the singular path approaches the steady state from the left of the 
isocline è = 0 in Figure 1, a(t) > 0 and A(t) monotonically rises. If the path approaches 
the steady state from the right, a[t) < 0 and A(t) monotonically decreases. 
Condition (18) requires that the marginal emission damage A( t )  is not "too convex" 
in time. For example, suppose the system approaches the steady state from the left so 
that A(t) > 0. Then condition (18) requires that either A(t) is decreasing over time, i.e., 
A(£) is increasing but concave in t, or is not increasing at a rate higher than the discount 
rate r. In other words, eventually the rate of increase of A(t) cannot be too high. 
From (5), we know rA — A = rèB" — ëB" — (è)2B'". Again, consider the system to 
the left of the steady state. Then sufficient conditions for (18) are ë > 0 and B'" < 0, or 
the absolute values of these two variables are low regardless of their signs. The following 
Proposition presents two additional sufficient conditions. 
Proposition 5 (i) The condition (18) is satisfied when the system is sufficiently close 
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to the steady state, (ii) It is also satisfied if the rate of increase of the marginal damage 
of atmospheric carbon, diy(C(t))/dt = D"(C)C, is constant or decreasing overtime. 
Sudden and drastic reductions in the emission level may occur at time zero as the 
system moves to the optimal trajectory. Afterwards, emissions tend to stabilize toward 
the steady state level. That is, the absolute value of ë tends to be small. Further, as 
the system moves toward the steady state, carbon stock will slowly approach its steady 
state level, or C, and D"C, will be decreasing. Thus, in general, we expect that (18) is 
satisfied. We assume this is the case in the paper.7 Propositions 3 and 4 rule out any 
cyclical patterns in the transition path and any spiral (the steady state being a spiral 
point) or orbital stability (such as limit cycles). In fact, since there is a unique singular 
path passing through the steady state, the steady state must be a saddle point. 
Remark 2 The optimal emission level and atmospheric carbon concentration are not 
cyclical: they should monotonically increase or decrease overtime. Further, under a 
rather general condition, the optimal path does not involve any cyclical patterns of carbon 
sequestration, or repeated sequestration and release activities. 
Proposition 4 and Remark 2 imply that the constraint A{ t )  > 0 is never binding. Since 
Aq is low, a(t) = â before the singular path is reached. Thus, if the system approaches 
the steady state from the left of è = 0, a(t) > 0 for all t, and thus A(t) > 0 for all t. If 
the system starts from the right of è = 0, carbon is sequestered first, and since A* > 0, 
only part of it is released later. Thus A(t) > 0 for all t. Therefore, 
Remark 3 On the optimal trajectory, A(t) > 0 for all t > 0. 
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Effects of Carbon Sequestration 
To completely characterize the paths of carbon emissions and sequestration, and to 
evaluate the effects of the availability of sinks on the optimal emission and stock, we need 
to specify the starting point, or the levels of {Co, Aq, e(0), o(0)}, in particular their relative 
positions to the steady state. It is safe to assume that A0 < A": since no mechanism 
exists to encourage carbon sequestration yet, the current use of carbon sinks is likely 
below the socially optimal long run level. In addition, as discussed in the introduction, 
the marginal cost of carbon sequestration is low (close to zero) if only a small amount of 
carbon is sequestered. We assume a low current rate of land conversion a(0). This rate 
may even be negative given widespread deforestation in many parts of the world. 
We refer to the recent IPCC reports to specify Co and e(0).8 IPCC (2000b, 2001) 
projects the atmospheric COg concentrations by year 2100 to be about 540 — 970 ppm for 
a wide range of emission scenarios. In contrast, the current CO% concentration is about 
360 ppm. In these scenarios, IPCC lists 450, 650 and 1000 ppm as possible alternative 
targets of CO2 concentration levels in the long run. These numbers seem to indicate that 
Co < C*.9 The IPCC (2001) further noted that to reach the three targets, CO2 emissions 
have to "drop below the 1990 levels within a few decades, about a century, or about two 
centuries, respectively, and continue to decrease steadily thereafter. Eventually, CO2 
emissions have to decline to a very small fraction of current emissions." We therefore 
assume that eo > e", and that eo is above the optimal emission level given GO and Aq. 
With our specification of the starting condition, the optimal transition path is rep­
resented by the heavy solid line in Figure 1, with the arrows indicating the direction of 
movement. Before the singular path is reached at time ii, a( t )  = à ,  and the motion of 
the system is dictated by the locus of è = 0 and C = 0 for a = a. To guarantee that the 
path reaches the singular path, e(0+) must fall below the stationary arm of the steady 
s ta te  assoc ia ted  wi th  a  =  à .  Along  the  en t i r e  t r ans i t ion  pa th ,  e ( t )  decreases  and  C(t )  
increases. 
Land is converted at its maximum rate à before ti, and is converted at a lower, 
but positive rate afterwards. Sequestered carbon is never released. Sequestration will 
be utilized as early and as extensively as possible. The intuition for this is as follows. 
At the beginning, the marginal cost of sequestration is low, lower than the marginal 
damage of an additional unit of carbon in the atmosphere, thus it makes economic sense 
to reduce (or eliminate) the difference between the marginal cost and marginal benefit 
of sequestration. The sooner this is done the better. However, the amount of carbon 
that can be sequestered at any point of time is constrained. So the best we can do is to 
sequester the maximum amount of carbon that can be sequestered to bridge the difference 
between the marginal cost and benefit of sequestration.10 Of course, early use of sinks 
should also be accompanied by (possibly drastic) emissions reduction. After the system 
reaches the singular path, a(t) should be set so as to maintain the equality of marginal 
cost and benefit of sequestration, as the carbon stock approaches its steady state level. 
To further study the effects of carbon sinks on the optimal emission levels, consider 
the optimal emission trajectory when sinks are not available, or when a(t) = 0 Vt, denoted 
by ë(t). At any stock level C, the fact that a(t) > 0 when sinks are available indicates 
that A(C) < À(C), where À(C) is the marginal damage of emissions without the sinks.11 
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The reason is that sequestration offers an additional way of reducing the carbon stock, 
thereby reducing the marginal damage of emissions. Since £?(•) is concave, we know from 
(5) that e(C) > ë(C) for all C < C*. Figure 1 shows the relative positions of the two 
paths: the optimal trajectory with sinks lies strictly above that without sinks, before 
reaching the steady state. In summary, 
Remark 4 (i) Sequestration should be utilized as early as possible, accompanied by a 
reduction of the emissions, (ii) The availability of carbon sinks raises the optimal emis­
sions, or decreases the degree of emission reduction that is needed to reach the steady 
state level of carbon stocks. 
The Remark further shows the role of carbon sequestration: sinks only affect the 
processes, but not the steady state levels, of carbon emission and stock. This result, of 
course, is consistent with the steady state analysis in Remark 1. 
Implementation Mechanisms of Carbon Sinks 
We have shown above that sequestration can be used to reduce the pressure on emission 
abatement. In this section, we propose and assess three distinct trading mechanisms, 
each of which can implement the socially optimal level of carbon sequestration. We 
refer to the three mechanisms as Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG), Variable Length Contract 
(VLC), and Carbon Annuity Account (CAA). All three mechanisms are designed to be 
implemented within a well functioning permit market for carbon emission reductions. 
Thus, we assume there is a carbon permit trading system, and that the permit price in 
the system is efficient: P(£) = B'(e(t)) = A(t). We analyze how trade between sources 
and sinks can take place efficiently, yielding the optimal amount of sequestration. We 
also discuss some of the potential advantages and drawbacks of the three mechanisms in 
terms of ease of implementation. Throughout this discussion, one "carbon credit" means 
a unit of carbon that is permanently removed from the atmosphere and the carbon price 
is the payment for one full carbon credit. 
The Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) System 
In a PAYG system, owners of sinks sell (and repurchase) emission credits based simply on 
the permanent reduction of carbon. For example, in the first year, a farmer who adopts 
conservation tillage practices on 100 acres may earn 200 permanent carbon reduction 
credits which he can then sell at the going rate. If, in the fifth year, the farmer plows 
the field and releases all of his stored carbon, he would be required to purchase carbon 
credits from the market at the going price to cover his emissions. 
In a world of certainty, the price trajectory P( t )  is known. Suppose there is perfect 
competition in the sink credit market. Then the competitive solution is equivalent to 
the problem of maximizing the present discounted revenue from carbon sequestration, 
a(t)P(t), minus the sequestration cost Q(A(t)). Mathematically, the problem can be 
written as, 
s.t. À( t )  =  a( t ) ,  0 < A( t )  < A, a  <  a( t )  <  a .  
As in the last section, we first ignore the constraint A( t )  >  0, and derive the optimal!ty 
conditions. We show that these conditions replicate the social planner's problem. Then 
(19) r °[P( t )a( t )  - Q(A(())J 
Jo  
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by Remark 3, we know the constraint is not binding. Thus in the balance of this section, 
we will ignore the constraint A(t) > 0. 
The Hamiltonian is H l  = P( t )a ( t )  — Q(A( t ) )  — f i ( t )a ( t ) ,  and the first order necessary 
conditions are 
/ / 
> 0 ,  
(20) max#1 or a( t )  < 
= a 
= a if P( t )  ~  f i ( t )  
f i ( t )  = r/z(t) -
G [a, a] 
dH 1  
< 0 ,  
= 0. 
dA 
= 
r/*(<) - <9'(A(t)), 
lira e  r  n( t )  = 0. £—oc 
The first order conditions are the same as (6), (8), and the transversal!ty condition for 
H in (9). Together with the efficient permit price P(t) = A(t), these conditions exactly 
replicate the social planner's choice of sequestration together with abatement. Therefore, 
given that the permit price equals the present discounted value of marginal damage, 
the PAYG is efficient. Given the obvious practical difficulties (i.e., the obligation of 
purchasing credits upon release, intentional or accidental) of implementing and enforcing 
such a system, we present the efficiency results in large part as a basis of comparison for 
the following two systems. 
The Variable Length Contract (VLC) System 
The VLC system might evolve through independent broker arrangements. If a broker 
wishes to buy permits from sink sources and sell them to emitters, the broker must 
contract with sink sources to achieve a permanent reduction in carbon. This could be 
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accomplished by making a contract with one farmer to adopt conservation tillage for, 
say 3 years before plowing the field, contracting with a second farmer to plant trees 
beginning in year 4 for a certain number of years and so on. In each period, the broker 
might offer farmers a menu of prices associated with different contract lengths. In this 
system, private brokers provide the service of generating "permanent" carbon reductions 
from a series of separate temporary reductions. 
Formally, suppose that a broker offers farmers a menu of prices for different contract 
lengths in each period. Let q(t, r) be the price offered at time t for a contract with 
length r. Then given this price menu, a farmer's decision is to maximize the net gain 
from carbon sequestration by choosing units of land for contracts of different lengths. 
Let a(t, r) be the units of land enrolled at time t for a contract length of r periods. The 
farmer's problem is 
where [q ( t ,  r )a ( t ,  r)] dr  is the sum of total revenue at time t  from contracts of all 
(21) q( t ,  r )a ( t ,  r )dr  — Q{A{ t ) )  d t  
a  <  A{ t )  <  Ô,  
lengths; /0°° a( t ,  r )dr  is the total units at time t  of newly enrolled land under contracts 
of  a l l  l eng ths ,  and ,  a( t  — r ,  r )dr  i s  t he  to ta l  un i t  o f  con t rac t s  exp i r ing  a t  t ime  t .  
Proposition 6 The VLC system is efficient if 
(22) q( t ,  t )  = P( t )  -  e  ""P( t  + T). 
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The proof is given in . The condition in (22) is intuitive: for the VLC to be efficient, 
the price paid to the temporary storage should equal the difference between the damage 
that is reduced when carbon "flows into" the sinks and the added (discounted) damage 
when carbon is released into the atmosphere. 
The condition in (22) will always be satisfied if there is no arbitrage in the trading of 
VLCs and emission permits. To see this, suppose a certain contract, say q(t. r), is offered 
that is different from (22), and without loss of generality, suppose q(t, r) > q(t, r). Then 
a  broker  can  ea rn  s t r i c t ly  pos i t ive  p ro f i t s  by  buy ing  a t  t ime  t  an  emiss ion  pe rmi t  a t  P{t ) ,  
selling at £ a VLC for the length of r at q(t, r), and selling at t + r the emission permit 
at P(t + r). The strategy clearly covers the broker's position: at each moment, the 
broker's balance of net emission is zero. However, the broker's loss in buying and selling 
the emission permit, —P{t) + e"rTP(t + r) = —q(t, r), is more than covered by the gain 
in selling the VLC, q(t, r), leading to the arbitrage opportunity. 
Arbitrage opportunities are not likely to arise if the emission permit and VLC trading 
markets are perfectly competitive. For a global pollutant like carbon with countless 
emission sources, the emission permit market is likely to be competitive. The nature 
of the VLC market will depend on the geographical distribution of the sinks and the 
brokers. It can be competitive if multiple brokers operate in each geographical area of 
carbon sinks. Since the owners of the sinks (i.e. farmers) do not have to directly "pay out" 
when carbon is released, the VLC approach is likely to be more feasible to implement 
compared with the PAYG system. 
The "ton-years" accounting method mentioned in the introduction section can be 
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made equivalent to the VLC if the correct discount factor is used. According to the 
"ton-years" accounting method, the amount of carbon sequestered is directly discounted, 
while in the VLC system, the price of sequestration is discounted. In both methods, 
the "correct "discount factor (either for quantity or price), depends on the duration of 
sequestration, the discount rate for future damage and the natural decay rate of carbon. 
The Carbon Annuity Account (CAA) System 
Finally, a CAA system may be the most straightforward to implement of all three systems. 
Similar to the PAYG system, in a CAA system, the generator of a sink is paid the full 
value of the permanent reduction in the GHG's stored in the sink. However, CAA is also 
different from PAYG in that the payment, in stead of being paid to a farmer (or whoever 
sequesters carbon), is put directly into an annuity account. The payment deposited in 
the annuity account works as a "bond"—with the money in the account, the farmer is 
discouraged to release her stored carbon, and if she releases it, it is guaranteed that she 
will be able to pay at least partly for the released carbon. As long as the sink remains in 
place, the owner can access the earnings of the annuity account, but not the principal. 
The principal is reduced at the on-going permit price when and if the sink is removed 
(e.g. the soil is tilled or other change is made to release the stored carbon). If the sink 
remains permanently, the sink owner eventually earns all of the interest payments, the 
discounted present value of which equals the principal itself - the permanent permit price. 
We now show that a CAA system is efficient. 
Let M(t )  be the balance in the CAA account. Then in each period, M(t ) r  will be the 
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farmer's revenue, and Q{A( t ) )  will be her cost. The farmer's objective is to maximize 
the present discounted value of net revenue. 
roc 
(23) Max /  [M( t ) r  -  Q(A( t ) ) ]e~ T t dt  
a(0 Jo 
s.t. À( t )  = a(t), 0 < A( t )  <  Â ,  a  <  a( t )  <  a .  
M{ t )  =  a( t )P( t ) .  
Let 0( t )  be the costate variable for M(t ) .  Again, we first ignore the constraint A( t )  >  0. 
Then the current value Hamiltonian is H2 = M(t)r — Q(A(t)) + 9(t)a(t)P(t) — //(t)a(t), 
and the necessary conditions are, 
> 0 ,  
(24) max H 2  or a( t )  < 
= o 
= a if 6( t )P( t )  — f i ( t )  < 
[a, a] 
< 0 ,  
= 0, 
(25) 
(26) 
9{ t )  =  r0{ t )  — dH
2  
dM 
= r0( t )  — r  =  r{6{ t )  — 1 ) ,  
dH 2  j i ( t )  = rn{ t )  -  = rfj. ( t )  -  Q' (A{ t ) ) .  
Rearranging (25), we know jL [Q( t )  — 1] = r[0( t )  — 1], which implies that 6{ t )  — 1 = 
ert [6(0) — 1]. But since 0(0) = 1, that is, the marginal value of money in period zero is 
equal to one, we know 6{t) = 1 for all t. Then the necessary conditions are the same as 
those in the PAYG system. Thus the CAA system is efficient. 
Discussion and Final Remarks 
Resolving the permanence issue will be key to introducing carbon sequestration into the 
Kyoto Protocol or any other international agreement concerned with global warming. In 
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this paper, we have addressed this issue directly with a model of carbon emissions and 
sequestration dynamics. Several valuable policy insights come directly from the frame­
work. First, the view that carbon sequestration should not be used to address global 
warming is not warranted from a theoretical perspective. Ultimately, as long as there is 
less carbon in the air, it does not matter whether the reduction is done by sequestration 
or emission abatement. We showed that carbon sequestration should be used as early as 
possible (as long as it is ever efficient to use it) to reduce the pressure on emission abate­
ment, and the carbon flow into sinks lasts until the atmospheric carbon concentration is 
stabilized. We also ruled out any cyclical patterns of carbon sequestration and release in 
the utilization of sinks. 
The insights concerning the efficient and early use of sequestration shown in this paper 
are particularly interesting in light of the current policy forum about global warming. 
Some businesses and even some nations, including the U.S., are very reluctant to take 
actions to reduce carbon emissions. Sequestration can reduce the pressure on emission 
abatement in current periods, providing time to develop political support for and the 
technological capability to reduce carbon emissions. 
However, despite the clear theoretical role for carbon sequestration, it is equally clear 
that it should not be treated the same as carbon emission reductions. Sequestration, by 
its nature, always has the potential to be temporary; consequently, it cannot be attributed 
the same value that emission reductions have if an efficient solution is to be obtained. 
The correct view is that sequestration has value, but the value is different from (and 
less than) the value of direct emission reduction. Therefore, special mechanisms should 
be used to address the difference. We define three such systems and demonstrate the 
efficiency properties of each of them. 
To properly implement any of the three systems, we will need accurate approaches 
to measure the amount of carbon stored in sinks. Likewise, for carbon trading to occur 
between sinks and emission sources, all three systems need price information from outside 
the agricultural and forest sector. PAYG and CAA both require the current permit prices 
and VLC requires prices of temporary carbon storage for all lengths of duration. Note 
that there is nothing preventing the simultaneous use of all systems. 
Given that all three systems can be demonstrated to yield the theoretically efficient 
solution, the choice between which, if any, of these systems to actually implement may 
largely depend on the costs involved of implementation as well as the general acceptability 
of the approach to all involved. On this score, we suspect that the repayment obligations 
inherent in the PAYG system will render it politically infeasible. The CAA system might 
be more appealing because it partially solves the repayment problem. The comparison of 
the systems also depends on how their efficiency will be altered when the carbon prices 
are not efficient. This issue is an interesting topic for future research. 
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Appendix A Derivation of the Optimal Transition Paths 
We prove the propositions used in deriving the optimal transition paths. 
Proof of proposition 1. We follow a similar approach used by Tsur and Zemel, 
who extend the Spence and Starrett methodology to more than one state variables. 
Suppose the time path of the costate variable A(£) is given. Thus from the necessary 
conditions (5) and (7), we know e(t) and C(t) are completely determined by A(t). In 
particular, we write them as e(A(i)) and C(A(t),A(t)). 
Then, by (3) and (4), we can rewrite the optimal control problem for a( t )  as 
(27) 
max J e~ T t  [s(e(A)) - D (c(A(t),A(*))) - A [e(A)-a -<5C(A(t), Â(f))] - <?(A)] dt  
s.t. A = a ,  a  <  a  <  â. 
We can check that the necessary conditions in (27) replicate the original necessary con­
ditions for a in (6) and (8). 
Replacing a by À in the objective function, and integrating e~ r t XÀdt  by parts, we 
know (27) can be rewritten as 
max/ e~rt [fl(e(A)) - Ae(A) - D (c(A(t), À(é))) + X6C(X( t ) ,  Â(i))] dt .  
(28) + / [-A(6A - D'(C(A, X))) - Q(A)] dt  - A(0)Ao 
Thus given A(t), the objective function depends only on A. We only need to choose A(t) 
to maximize the second integrand in (28) for each time t, and the first order condition is 
(29) -<5A + D'(C)  =  Q'{A) .  
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With A(£) = //(£) and A = (i on the singular path, we know from (7) and (8) that 
condition (29) is satisfied on the singular path. Thus, the objective function in (28) is 
maximized on the singular path. 
Since (28) depends only on A, we would want to move to the optimal path of A, or 
the  s ingu la r  pa th ,  a s  soon  as  poss ib le .  Thus  the  op t ima l  so lu t ion  invo lves  choos ing  a( t )  
to be either a or â until the singular path is reached. Once the arc is reached, the system 
stays on it forever. • 
Proof of proposition 2. From (7) and (8), we know A = (r + <5)Â — D"C and 
ji = rfi — Q"a. However, A = ft and Â = p. on the singular path. Thus we know 
Q"a = —6 [(r + 6)A — D'] + D"(e — a — 6C), which implies (17). • 
Proof of proposition 3. Part (i). We first prove that e ( t )  is monotonie. Suppose 
this is not true. In particular suppose there exists a time t < oo such that è(t) = 0. In 
the phase diagram, if the path crosses è = 0 from the left, e(t) must be convex in time: 
it first decrease and then increases. Similarly, if the path crosses è = 0 from the right, 
e(t) must first increase and then decrease. The two possibilities are described in Figure 
A1 by the four short arrowed curves. 
Figure Al. Here 
Therefore, if a path has ever crossed the è  = 0 curve, there are only two scenarios in 
which the path will approach the steady state. In the first case, the last crossing of é = 0 
is from the right, and thus the system approaches the steady state from the left. Since 
è(t) < 0 before reaching the steady state, the last crossing must have occurred above the 
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steady state along the é = 0 line. This path is depicted as Path One in Figure Al. In 
the second scenario, the last crossing is from the left, and the path finally approaches 
the steady state from the right. Thus e(t) is increasing after the last crossing, and the 
crossing point is below the steady state on the é = 0 isocline. 
Consider Path One. Since the é = 0 isocline is downward slopping, the carbon stock 
C(t i )  a t  the  c ross ing  t ime  t i  i s  lower  than  the  s t eady  s t a t e  l eve l  C*.  Thus  a f t e r  t \ ,  C( t )  
will eventually increase. However, immediately after (%, C(t) is decreasing since the path 
crossed the è = 0 isocline from the right. Therefore, there exists a time t2 > 11 at which 
C(t2) = 0 Further, at this time, (C(f2), e(f2)} is to the northwest of the steady state. 
This observation implies that a(t2) > 0, since the C = 0 isoclines are higher as o is 
higher. 
Taking a time derivative of (7) and (8), and using A(£) = A = /z, and A = j l  
on the singular path, we know 6À(f2) = —Q"(A(£i))a(£2). However, since ê(f2) < 0, we 
know Â(£2) > 0, violating the fact that a(t2) > 0 (since Q" > 0). Thus Path One never 
arises. 
Similarly, we can show that Path Two should not arise either. Establishing the 
monotonicity of e(t) on the singular path. 
If there are infinite number of crossings so that there is not a last crossing, a point 
like (C(t2), e(t2)} (or its counterpart to the right of è = 0) still exists when the system 
is close to the steady state. Thus, our proof still carries through. 
Part (ii): We next prove that C{t )  is monotone. Without loss of generality, consider 
the singular path that is to the left of the é = 0 isocline so that e(t) < 0. (we have 
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just shown that the path should never cross the isocline). Suppose there exists a time 
oc > t3 > 0 such that C(t3) = 0. Differentiating (7) and (8) and adjusting, using 
A(£) = /x(£), we know <5Â(£a) = —Q"a{tz). But since À = B"è > 0, we know a(t^) < 0. 
Figure A2. Here. 
Therefore, in Figure 1, the system at £3 must be at a point on the <7 = 0 isocline for 
a negative a level. Since this isocline is upward slopping, we know this point must be 
below the steady state. The point is represented by x in Figure A2. Thus, to reach the 
steady state, e(£) must eventually increase. But this condition contradicts the fact that 
we are to the left of the é = 0 isocline, or e(£) cannot increase. • 
Proof of proposition 4. From (8), we know Q"a = rfi — jl. Substituting A for fj. 
along the singular path, we know a = (rÀ — A)/Q" • To the left of the steady state, À > 0. 
Thus a > 0 if and only if rX > A, or A/À < r. To the right of the steady state, À < 0. 
Then  a  <  0  i f  and  on ly  i f  rX  < A,  o r  A/À <  r .  •  
Proof of proposition 5. Without loss of generality, we consider the case when the 
optimal path is to the left of the è = 0 isocline, or when A > 0. 
Differentiating (7) with respect to time, we know A/À = r  +  6  — D"{C)C/X .  Thus 
(18) is true if and only if 
(30) 6X <  dD' (C( t ) ) /d t .  
At the steady state, (r + S)X*  =  D' (C*)  (cf. (11)). Before the steady state, X >  0, 
or (r + 6)A(£) > D'(C(t)). Therefore, when the system is sufficiently close to the steady 
state, the left hand side, (r + 6)A(£), must be increasing at a smaller rate than the right 
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hand side ZX(C(t)). That is, (r+ <5)À(<) < diy(C( t ) ) fd t ,  which implies (30). This proves 
the first part of the Proposition. 
Differentiating (10a) with respect to £, and integrating the resulting right hand side 
by parts, we can show that 
(31) À = J e-(r+6)(s-t)d\D'(CJS))]dt^ 
If = D"(C)C(s )  is constant, then the right hand side equals d[p J (r S), 
which together with (31) implies (18). If d^D is decreasing, then (31) implies Â < 
d^° + <5), and (18) follows from (30). • 
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof. Define à( t )  as follows, 
( B l )  à ( t )  =  À { t )  = f a ( t , T ) d r —  f a ( t  —  T , T ) d r .  
Jo Jo 
We show below Problem (21) is just the same as Problem (19) with à( t )  in place 
of a(t). We have shown the solution to Problem (19) is efficient. If both problems are 
the same, then the solution to Problem (21) also has to be efficient. Plug (22) into the 
objective function of problem (21), we get 
17 e~rt Ifo <?(*' r)a(£' T)dr ~ QM(t))]dt 
= Jo e ~ r t  [ / r  [ p (0  -  +  t ) ]  a( t ,  r )dr  -  Q(A( t ) ) }  d t  
=  -So  e~ r t Q(A( t ) ) \d t  +  + / ~ [ / ^ ( P ( I ) A ( T , r)dr\ dt 
- J7 E~RT L/T E-RTP(T + T))a(t, r)dr\ dt 
=  - / "  e~ r t Q(A( t ) ) ]d t  
+ 
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Jo' e-" [J"~(P( t )a ( t ,  T)dT]  d t  -  / "  c'" [/J, P(t)a(t - t .  r)rfr] df 
= " J7 e-"9(A(t))]di + /~ e-" [/"(P(i)a(t, r)rfr - ^  P(t)a(t - r, r)dr] rft 
= ~SV e~"Q(A(t))}dt + /" e-"P(t)a(i)dt 
It is easy to see that the above expression is just the same as that in Problem (19) 
wi th  a( t )  r ep laced  by  à( t ) .  
The third line follows because of the following, 
Jo° e~ r t  [/o° e _ r T P{t  +  T) )a ( t ,  r )dr]  d t  
=  / "  e-r(<+T)p(t + r) )a ( t .  r )d tdr (By change of integration order) 
= f^° (e~ r x P(x) )a (x  — r ,  r )dxdr (By change  o f  va r i ab le ,  x  =  t  +  r , y  =  r )  
= /^° f* e_rx P{x))a{x — r, r)rfrrfx(By change of integration order) 
= JTe  r t  [/o -  t '  T)d r  dt. 
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Nfeoto Protocol currently allows only forests as carbon sinks, but left the door open 
for soil carbon sequestration through changes in land management practices. 
2Other issues related to sinks include measurement, accounting rules, verification procedures 
and leakage. 
3The Umbrella Group, a loose alliance of Annex I Parties that includes the US, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and New Zealand, urged the 
development of simple procedures that facilitate the widespread use of mechanisms across 
a broad range of practices (including sequestration), while the European Union insisted on 
imposing limitations on the use of sinks, including the exclusion of "additional activities" in 
the first commitment period and quantitative limit for the use of sinks in Clean Development 
Mechanism projects. 
^Montgomery formally establishes the monotonicity and convexity of the abatement cost 
function. 
5VVe can relax the monotonicity assumption by allowing B ' ( e )  to be negative. Then in our 
paper, the relevant domain of B(-) is [0, ë], where ë is the optimal emission level in the absence 
of any regulation, i.e., B'(ë) = 0. We ignore this domain restriction because it is never binding. 
G If a substantial amount of land is diverted from agricultural production, agricultural output 
prices may increase and the profit reduction Q(A) would be even greater. Then Q(A) is likely 
to be convex even with homogeneous land. 
7In the rare cases, where (18) is not satisfied, A ( t )  may not be monotone and there may be 
cyclical patterns of carbon sequestration and release. Such patterns need further study. 
8IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) was established in 1988 by the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations7 Environmental Program 
(UNEP). It organizes scientists from all over the world to conduct rigorous surveys of the latest 
technical and scientific literature on climate change. The IPCC's assessment reports are widely 
recognized as the most credible sources of information on climate change. 
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9On the other hand, IPCC (2001) cites an increasing body of observations supporting the 
notion that global warming is already happening (and that most of the warming observed over 
the last 50 years is attributable to human activities). Depending on the damage of the warming 
(which may takes some years to realize) and the costs of reducing the current emissions (which 
we do not consider in this paper), it is also possible that the steady state C' should be lower 
than the current Cq. Our analysis can be easily extended to analyze this situation. 
l0If the system starts from the right of è  = 0, a ( t )  =  â before the singular path is reached, 
after which a(t) < 0. However, since A* > 0, only part of sequestered carbon is released. In 
this situation, sinks are utilized early and to a great extent, so much so that part of the stored 
carbon has to be released. 
uTo simplify notation, we write A as a function of C  , instead of t .  because the systems 
with and without carbon sequestration will arrive at C at different times. Strictly speaking, 
we should write A(tt) < Â(^), where <i, t2 are such that C(£i) = C and C(<2) = C. In this 
paragraph, we will use similar notations for e(-) and è( ). 
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C = 0 for 
a(t) = 5" e(t) 
e(0) 
C = 0 for 
a ( t )  = 0  
C = 0 for 
a(r) = a 
G, C(f,) C(t) C 
Figure I : Phase Diagram for Carbon Emission and Stock 
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e = 0  
C = 0 for 
û(/)> 0 
C = 0 for 
a( t )  =0 Path I 
\ Path 2 
C(t) C 
Figure A1 : Possible Singular Paths 
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e(t) 
C = 0 for 
a ( t )  = 0  
C = 0 for 
a(t)< 0 Steady 
State/ 
C(t) 
Figure A2: The Position of the System at t: 
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CHAPTER 3. 
ALTERNATIVE INTERTEMPORAL PERMIT 
TRADING REGIMES WITH STOCHASTIC ABATEMENT COSTS 
A paper to be submitted to 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
Abstract 
When there are large number of firms, permit trading within one period tends to 
absorb firm-specific shocks in that period. In the presence of industry-wide shocks, 
however, allowing trade across time can attain a higher welfare level than a no-banking 
system. Bankable permit regimes with a 1-to-l or non-unitary intertemporal trading 
ratios (ITRs) are examined. When banking is welfare improving, the optimal ITR is 
always less than 1+r, the ITR for monetary values. The more industry-wide shocks vary, 
and/or the more they are negatively correlated across time, the more efficient a bankable 
permit regime. Bankable permits with ITR=1 or ITR=l+r can both do better than a 
no banking regime. However, which one is better depends on the covariance structure of 
the shocks and the benefit and damage functions. 
Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the use of tradable permit systems, 
which have been adopted for pollution control both in the U.S. and by an increasing 
number of nations (Stavins, 2000). While most permit systems focus on the flexibility 
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provided by trading among or within emitting sources, the flexibility provided by trading 
across time has also been considered. Temporal permit trading may include banking and 
borrowing. Banking occurs when permits authorized for the current period are saved 
for use in some subsequent period. Borrowing occurs when permits authorized for some 
future period are instead used now. Temporal trading can lower compliance costs by 
allowing hedging against risks in emissions patterns and smoothing out fluctuations in 
abatement costs over time. Stavins (2000), Kolstad and Toman (2000) and Tietenberg 
(2000) all recognized that the temporal dimension can be a key component of a permit 
trading system. 
In fact, banking has played an important role in some pollution control programs. 
For example, banking has likely enhanced the performance of the SO2 allowance trading 
program (Ellerman et al. 1997), the U.S. lead rights trading program a decade earlier 
(Kerr and Maré, 1997) and the control of automobile hydrocarbon emissions in California 
(Rubin and Kling, 1993). Other examples that have made use of bankable permits include 
the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards for automobiles and light trucks, which 
allowed banking and, in some cases, borrowing (Farrell et al. 1999); the Ozone Transport 
Region NOz and VOCs emission trading program, which allowed banking; and, as an 
example of state-level programs, the Delaware NOz and VOCs emission trading program, 
which also allowed banking.1 
In spite of the potential for application of bankable permits, and the extensive studies 
on permit trading (see Tietenberg 1985, and Cropper and Oates 1992 for a review), there 
'For a comprehensive description of permit trading programs, see Stavins (2000). 
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is limited research on the efficiency of bankable permits. Much of the literature on 
tradable permit systems has focused on the cost-effectiveness of these pollution control 
mechanisms. Most economists now agree that permit trading, including bankable permit 
programs can be cost-effective (Tietenberg 1985, Cronshaw and Kruse 1996. and Rubin 
1996). 
While separating means (cost-effective instruments) from ends (efficiency) highlights 
a strength of permit trading systems, there are limitations to this wisdom. As Stavins 
(1998) notes, "one risks designing a fast train to the wrong station". Kling and Rubin 
(1997) demonstrate the risks from focusing on cost-effectiveness by showing that, in 
a bankable permit system, firms will suboptimally choose excessive emissions in early 
periods and correspondingly too few in later periods. Leiby and Rubin (2000) extend 
their study to stock pollutants. Neither of these two models considers the consequences 
of incomplete information. 
However, with complete information, there is no real advantage to permit trading, 
either across time or across firms, since the regulator can set the optimal number of 
permits for each firm in each period. Thus, it is important to analyze bankable permits in 
a framework with incomplete information. Yates and Cronshaw (2001) provides a careful 
analysis of bankable permits when polluting firms have better information about their 
abatement costs than a regulator. They investigate what is the optimal intertemporal 
trading ratio (ITR) and whether allowing bankable permits is welfare improving given 
that the bankable permit system is optimally designed. 
Our work builds upon the Yates and Cronshaw study in several important aspects. 
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First, we recognize that what really drives intertemporal trading is industry wide shocks, 
not firm specific shocks. When there are a large number of firms, firm specific shocks in 
any period tend to be absorbed by permit trading among firms in that period. However, 
since every firm is affected by the same industry wide shocks, these shocks cannot be 
absorbed by static permit trading. This is where allowing banking or borrowing may be 
welfare improving. 
Second, instead of focusing on the optimal ITR, we examine two special ITRs that are 
likely to be considered by policymakers due to their simplicity: the unitary ITR under 
which permits in every period are treated the same, and a non-unitary ITR where the 
interest rate on banked (or borrowed) permits are the same as the monetary interest rate. 
Using a two-period model, we find that a unitary bankable permit regime can dominate 
a no-banking regime if the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal damage 
curve and uncertainties in the two periods are adequately negatively correlated. We also 
find that allowing intertemporal trading with an ITR = 1+r is always welfare improving 
as long as the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal damage curve. 
Third, in Yates and Cronshaw (2001), firms are assumed to know the shocks in 
both periods, while in our model, firms know the shocks in the first period but not the 
second. This is an important distinction as we show that as firms' information advantage 
decreases, the gain from allowing intertemporal trading becomes smaller. To the extent 
that firms in general do not actually have complete information about second period 
shocks, this result is important to consider whether banking should be a part of permit 
trading system. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We lay out the basic elements of 
the model in the next section. In the third section, we examine firms' behaviors in 
alternative bankable permit regimes. Section 4 examines the unitary and non-unitary 
bankable permit regimes. Section 5 concludes. 
Model Setup 
Assume a two period situation, t = 1,2, with multiple firms, i = 1,2, ...n. A pollutant 
is emitted in both periods. Let e\ be firm i's emissions and et = 53 e| be the total emis-
i  
sions of all the firms in period t .  Since higher emissions represent lower levels of abate­
ment, firms benefit from emissions and the benefits are equivalent to the saved abatement 
costs. In each period, random shocks occur to firms' benefit functions. This could be 
technological progress or changes in the market environment.2 Let ^ rr2) be 
the firm specific shock for firm i  in period t ,  and $ ^  (0, <t \) be the industry wide shock. 
Firm-specific shocks may arise from a firm's internal production or management process, 
while industry-wide shocks could be due to fluctuations in the demand for the industry's 
products or the supply of its inputs. Shocks may be persistent, i.e., and could be 
correlated across time. 
2 For example, the current marginal abatement costs for SO2 are much lower than were estimated 
ten years ago. Over the decade preceding 1995, a typical unit's marginal abatement cost function was 
lowered by almost S50 dollars per ton of SO2 by technical improvements including advances in the ability 
to burn low-sulfur coal at existing generators, as well as improvements in overall generating efficiency. 
Moreover, the decline in fuel costs lowered the marginal abatement costs by about $200 per ton (Carlson 
et al. 2000). 
Since we wish to study the consequences of stochastic influence on trading inde­
pendent  of  heterogeneity,  we assume firms have the same benefi t  function,  B(e\ ,  
with Be(-) > 0, B e e(-)  < 0. This simplifies the modeling allowing us to focus on the 
stochastic nature of the problem. The monotonicity and concavity of B(-) is a re­
sult of the monotonicity and convexity of the abatement cost function (in the level 
of abatement)3. Since every firm has the same industry wide shock we know if 
f*\, Pi) = Be(e{, nl, _u°), then Be/to(ej, fj,\, tf) = Betlo(e{, fiJt, n°) for any That 
is, $ affects the marginal benefit equally across firms. The pollutant generates social 
damages, which for simplicity are assumed to depend on the total pollution by all firms. 
Let D(et) be the damage function4 with £>'(•) > 0, D"(-) > 0. 
Before the beginning of the first period, the regulator, without knowing the shocks in 
each period, has to determine the total number of permits to be issued for both periods 
and the intertemporal trading rules. We assume the regulator is able to commit. That 
is, after the number of permits and the trading ratio are set, they are then written into 
law and the regulator cannot change them. 
At the beginning of period 1, the shocks, n\ and occur and firms observe their 
realizations. They then distribute their permits between the two periods. When firms 
make their decisions in period 1, they do not know what the shocks will be in the second 
Montgomery (1972) formally establishes the monotonicity and convexity of the abatement cost 
function. 
4 Uncertainty in the damage function will affect our results only if it is correlated with uncertainty in 
the benefit function. Stavins (1996) provided an analysis of policy instrument choice when uncertainties 
are correlated. 
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period. However, they could update their information about the distributions of fil2, 
based on what they have observed. When shocks are correlated across time, firms, after 
knowing (i\, may have better information about y,l2, than the regulator had when 
the parameters of the market were set. If the shocks are perfectly correlated, then firms 
will know exactly what will be one period before their actual realizations. 
Firms' Problem 
In designing an optimal bankable permit regime, the regulator needs to take into 
account how firms behave in such a regime. So, we first derive firms' optimal decisions 
for a given regime, where the number of permits issued for each period is ë\ and e2, and 
the trading ratio for banked permits is set at 1+0. For every permit banked (borrowed), 
1+0 will be available for later use (be repaid), i.e., the interest rate on permits is 0. We 
will discuss two regimes. In the first, 0 = 0, i.e., a unitary intertemporal trading ratio 
is used. This case is of interest because it is simple to implement and is being used in 
actual bankable permits programs. In the second, 0 is chosen optimally. This case has 
been discussed in previous studies, as noted in the introduction. 
Montgomery (1972) first demonstrates that the decentralized behavior of firms in a 
permit trading system leads to the solution attainable under joint-benefit maximization. 
Yates and Cronshaw (2001) extend the result to an environment with intertemporal 
trading. Thus, to derive e[(ë1,ë2, 0), we do not have to study the decentralized permit 
trading market; we can simply maximize firms' joint-benefits from emissions subject to 
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the total permit cap: 
max [fi(e2'/4^2) I (1) 
such that ei + e2 < êt + Ë2 + 0(ëi — ei), e\ > 0. (2) 
where r is the financial interest rate and 0(ë i — ej) is the interest for banked (or borrowed, 
if ëi — et < 0) permits. The optimal conditions are. (second order conditions are satisfied 
by the curvature of the functions), 
n i x dB(ei,/^i,^) d£[B(ei,,j4,/z2) \  v \ , (4] 
(1+r)
—— 
= |1+6) §4 • 
dB(e\ ,  f i \ ,  f t f )  _  
dE[B{é2 ,n^y%) 1 /ij,/i?] _ dE [Bjej ,  /xj ,  $)  \ 
^ ^ 
(3a) 
(3b) 
Where i , j  = 1,2, ...n. Equation (3a) requires that the (adjusted) marginal benefit in the 
two periods be equal for all firms. The marginal benefit in the first period is multiplied by 
(1 + r) because benefits in the first period are worth (1 + r) more than those in the second 
period. The reason that the expected marginal benefits in the second period is multiplied 
by (1 + 0) is that one unit of permit saved in the first period will be worth (1 + 0) units 
of permit in the second period. Equations (3b)-(3c) are the usual marginal conditions 
for cost-effectiveness in a static permit market: the (expected) marginal benefits should 
be equal across firms at any point of time. Equation (3a) determines the distribution 
of permits between periods for any firm, while (3b)-(3c) determines how permits will be 
distributed across firms at any point of time. 
Remark 1 Industry vuide shocks do not generate within period permit trading. That is, 
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given an initial equilibrium, an industry wide shock will not change (3b) and (3c). 
The reason follows directly from the definition of industry wide shocks. Starting from 
an equilibrium, if (3b) and (3c) remain the same for the initial equilibrium upon any 
industry wide shock, then firms will have no reason to trade permits among themselves 
because their marginal benefit is the same. More specifically, since industry wide shocks 
affect every firm, if one firm has excessive demand for permits because it turns out to 
be expensive to abate emissions, then all other firms will also have excessive demand. 
When firms are identical and receive the same amount of initial permits, in the absence 
of firm-specific shocks, all firms will have the same amount of excessive demand (supply), 
thus, no trading takes place. 
While industry wide shocks maintain the homogeneity of firms, firm specific shocks 
tend to break this homogeneity and thus make trading profitable. With firm specific 
shocks, one firm may find it costly to abate emissions and have excessive demand for 
permits, while another finds it cheap to do so and has excessive supply of permits. Thus, 
it is profitable for the first firm to buy some permits from the second, and both firms 
share the gains from intra-period trading. 
Remark 2 When there are a large number of firms, firm specific shocks tend to cancel 
each other. Formally, let /zf, /z°) and ë^^î, l*\, —A4"; A*i) be the solution to 
(3a)-(3c), then, for any given industry wide shock (fi®), we have 
= 1, where ct(/z°) is independent of firm specific 
shocks. 
lim Pr 71—»00 
E,4(.) 
-ctitf) < £ 
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Since our focus is on intertemporal trading, the explanation for the remark is given in 
the appendix. Given the above remark and our focus on permit trading across time, we 
work now with a single firm, representing all regulated firms. Then, the firms' problem 
and the corresponding optimal conditions can be rewritten as follows, 
max B (e!,/i?) + j^;E [B(e2,/4) I M°] (4a) 
Such that ei + e2 ^ ei + e2 + 9(e 1 — e%), e\ ,  eo > 0; (4b) 
9B t  (ei ,^) /9ei  1 + 0 
dE[B2(e2 ,r t ) \ t f] /de2  1+r '  {  °>  
Yates and Cronshaw (2001) have shown the parameters that matter are 0 and ë, which 
is the present discounted value of ëL and ëg, i.e., ë = ëx + —^ë2. Given that firms are 
allowed to move emissions freely between periods, the number of permits issued for any 
period has little real meaning. From (4b)-(4c), we know, in a bankable permit regime, 
firms' emissions in both periods are functions of ë and 9, and in general will be different 
from ê\ and ë2. In the following analysis, we will examine the efficiency of alternative 
bankable permit regimes. 
Optimal Bankable Permit Regimes 
To design an optimal bankable permit regime, the regulator chooses 9 and ë to max­
imize the expected benefits minus costs, knowing that firms choose their emission levels 
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e x{ë,9)  and e2(ê,0) according to (4b)-(4c). Thus, the regulators problem is, 
max E \W{e l(ë ,9) ,e2(ë ,  0))] 
= E [B(e,(ë, »),*«?) + î±rrB(e2{ê,9),£) - D(c,(ê,6)) - ^ £>(£,(6,6))] 
such that ë > 0, 9 > 0. (5) 
The firms' emissions for each period are fixed when banking is not allowed. In this 
case, the condition for social welfare maximizing is, 
V( = 1,2; i = ,6) 
oet uGt 
where the superscript, "r?6", stands for the ex ante no-banking social optimal level. 
Equation (6) says that emission standards should be set such that the expected marginal 
benefits equal the marginal damages in each period. 
We next solve e x  and e2 when they are a function of (ë ,  9) .  To facilitate the comparison 
between no banking and banking, we use second-order Taylor expansions of the benefit 
and damage functions around the no banking social optimal5, e"6, i.e., 
= B0  + (Bi + fi®) (e t  — e"6) — |Bu(et — ef1)2 ,  (7a) 
D(e t)  = Dq + Di(e t  — e^6) + \Du{et — e"6)2, (7b) 
where Bq, Bi, Bn and Do, D\, Du are fixed coefficients with B\ > 0, Bn > 0, D\ > 0, 
£>n >0. Uncertainty is assumed to affect the marginal benefit function by shifting it up 
or down, while keeping its slope unchanged. By (6), we know B\ = D\. 
°The "accurate local approximation" is very similar to what was originally used in VVeitzman (1974) 
and since then has been widely used in other studies; for example, Kolstad (1987), Hoel and Karp (1999 
and 2000), Newell and Pizer (1998). 
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To simplify notation, we define the following, 
Definition 1 Firms' demand for banking (Aet(e,6 ) )  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  d e ­
mand for permits in a banking regime and the no-banking optimum in period t given ë 
and (1 + 0), that is Aë, = et(ë,0) — e^6. 
The difference between ë and the no-banking optimal total permits is given by Aë = 
ë — ë™6, where ë = ë\ + y^ëg, and ë"6 = e"6+ y^eg6. 
Solving (4) with (7a), we get, 
= + (8a) 
Ae2(ë, fl) -d+r)(B1+/x°)+(l+fl)(Bi+g[^K|) (l+r)Aë 
(1 + 0 )  Bn[(l+r)+(l+0)2J + ÏÏ+^+iï+êF' ^ ' 
where on the left of the second equation is used to convert the second period 
emissions into its present discounted value, making it comparable to Aei(ë, 0).  
Given 1 + 0  and Aë, firms' demand for banking in each period depends on a four 
factors. The first is the slope of the marginal benefit curve (Bn). The flatter the 
marginal benefit curve is, the more emissions in a bankable permit regime deviate from 
the no banking optimal emissions. The second is the difference between total permits in 
a bankable permit regime and the no banking optimal total emissions(Aë). Whenever 
Aë > 0 (or < 0), firms will split the difference between the two periods to equalize 
0 Firms' demand for banking in any period has a one-to-one relationship with the number of permits 
actually issued for this period. If the number of permits increases by one then the demand for banking 
decreases by one. Thus, to focus on other factors affecting banking, we study demand for banking when 
the number of permits issued is equal to the no banking optimum. 
59 
marginal benefits across time. The third is the relative magnitudes of (expected) marginal 
benefits evaluated at the no banking optimum, i.e., Bi , and Bi+E [fulfil]. If marginal 
benefits in the first period adjusted by (1 + r) are higher than the expected marginal 
benefits in the second period adjusted by (1 + 5), then first period emissions tend to be 
higher. Lastly, if /z° and 3X6 negatively correlated, i.e., they tend to have opposite 
signs, their effects tend to enhance each other. Otherwise, their effects tend to cancel 
each other. 
Optimal Total Permits 
Substituting (8a)-(8b) into (5), we can derive the optimal ë (or Aë) and 9. We ap­
proach the problem in two steps. We first solve the optimal Aë for a given 9, and then 
discuss the optimal 9. 
Solving (5) for a any given 9, we have the following, 
Proposition 1 The optimal total permits in a bankable permit regime with any intertem­
poral trading ratio equals the total permits in a no-banking regime. That is, 
Aë = O,V0. (9) 
The result is due to the way firms distribute the difference Aë between the two 
periods. Firms distribute the extra permits across the two periods such that marginal 
benefits in the two periods remain equal. From (8), we know for any Aë, no matter what 
the realizations of the shocks are, firms allocate Aë to the first period and 
(i+r)+(i+9)2 ^  to the second period. This implies that, setting Aë ^ 0 does not help 
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adjust firms' distribution of emissions toward social optimal. So there is no reason to set 
Aë different from zero. 
Proposition 1 has one interesting policy implication: at least in terms of the total 
number of permits, the design of a bankable permit regime is no more complicated than 
a no banking regime. We next discuss the other parameter of a bankable permit regime, 
the intertemporal trading ratio, and compare the welfare of different permit trading 
regimes. 
Unitary Bankable Permit Regime For a unitary bankable permit regime, 9 is set at zero 
implying that firms can bank or borrow emissions across time periods at a one for one 
rate. As to the number of total permits, from Proposition 1, we know it is equal to the 
total permits in the optimal no banking regime. Substituting (9) back into the demand 
functions with 9 = 0, we get firms' demand for banking in a unitary bankable permit 
regime, 
Aef(£-0) „ + (10a) 
Ae?(e-,0) = + (10b) 
W + H on 
The explanation for (10) are the same as in (8) except that here the weight on the 
marginal benefit in the second period is 1 instead of 1 + 9. When there is no uncertainty, 
the demand for banking is, 
0 )  =  
°>- f o r  A - A - o .  ( i i )  
Thus in the absence of uncertainty, if permits for each period are set at the no-banking 
optimum, firms will desire borrowing. This point is made by Kling and Rubin (1997), 
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who find that in many cases firms would suboptimally choose excessive emission levels 
in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods given the opportunity to 
freely move emissions between time periods. This is because firms discount future benefit 
streams and disregard the social damages of their emissions. Equation (11) quantifies 
this effect. For comparison with later analysis, we illustrate the case in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, MB and MD are the marginal benefit and damage functions. When 
there is no uncertainty, social optimality, which is also the no banking optimum, requires 
that MB(e"b)=MZ)(e"fc) and M B(e2b)=M , implying e"6 = e??6 (= e"6) . However, 
if the regulator is going to issue permits equal to the no-banking optimal levels and then 
let firms trade with ITR=1, then the emission levels are e^6 and e26, with e"6 > e"6, 
e2b < e2b and e^6 — enb = enb — eî,6. When firms have the freedom to adjust their emissions 
through time, they will find e"b and e2b suboptimal, because by moving some emissions 
from period 2 to period 1 the additional benefits in period 1 will outweigh the reduced 
benefits in period 2. 
When there is uncertainty, from Ae"6(-) and Ae^(-) in (10), we know the higher the 
(conditional) expectation of second period marginal benefits for firms, the lower the first 
period emissions will be. However, it is not clear how firms' demand for permits will differ 
from the no-banking optimum because the relative magnitude of the uncertain terms is 
not known ex ante. 
Definition 2 The relative efficiency of a bankable permit regime (AE [W(ë, 6)\) is the 
welfare difference between a bankable permit regime and the no-banking regime, i.e., 
AE \W{ë,Q)\  = £[W( e i(ë ,0) ,e2(ê ,0)]  —E [W{e?,e?)] .  
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Substituting (10) back into the welfare function (5) and then comparing it with the 
no banking welfare level, we get, 
A E r Wub(ëub 0)1 — ~(gn+pn)( rgi)2  I  (gn-pn)g[(1~ t ' r)^°~^(M2lM?)] f io)  
I 'U'J 2(i+r)(2+r)B'f1 1 2(l+r)(2+r)8'fi ' ^ ^ 
The first term is negative, which represents the welfare loss (compared to a no banking 
regime). The sum of the two shaded areas on Figure 1 represents this loss. The slope 
of marginal benefit has two effects. On the one hand, as we discussed before, a flatter 
marginal benefit function means that a bigger emissions adjustment is needed to equalize 
marginal benefits across time. Since permits issued for each period are optimal in the 
absence of uncertainty, we want the adjustment of emissions as small as possible. In this 
sense, a steeper marginal benefit function will result in less loss, which is captured by 
in the denominator. On the other hand, for any given deviation of emissions from the 
optimal, we want both the marginal benefit and damage functions to be flatter, which is 
indicated by the presence of (Bu + Du) in the numerator. From (11), we also know the 
higher the marginal benefits are, the more emissions in the two periods will differ, which 
in turn means more loss will occur. This explains the term (rB\)2 in the numerator. 
The second term captures the welfare effects of uncertainty, which cannot be unam­
biguously signed (and is not represented in Figure 1). It will be positive if marginal 
benefit curve is steeper than marginal damage curve. Taking expectations, we have 
E [(1 + r)fi^ — E (^2Im?)]2 = (l+r)2<ri— 2(l+r)<r12 +<x^ , where <rf, <r12, and o^i, are the 
variance of the covariance of /z° and /i2, and the variance of the conditional expecta­
tion of /z2, respectively. That is, a\ = E [jz?]2 , rrl2 = E [^£*2] > and ^211 = E [E (/z2|/^)]2 -
Thus, the absolute value of the second term will be larger if and //2 have larger 
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variances and/or are negatively correlated. 
The factor Bn — Du in the second term is very similar to a term in Weitzman (1974). 
The no banking regime is a quantity tool since it fixes emissions in each period, just 
as a standard fixes the emissions for each firm. A bankable permit regime is akin to a 
price system in that emission levels in each period can deviate from the "standard" for 
the period7. In this sense, a bankable permit regime resembles a price tool. Weitzman 
(1974) showed that whether a price tool dominates a quantity tool depends on the slopes 
of the marginal benefit and damage functions. Similarly, whether a bankable permit 
regime dominates a no banking regime depends on the slopes of marginal benefit and 
damage functions. In both cases, how much one is preferred to the other depends on the 
covariance structure of the shocks. 
Thus, a unitary bankable permit regime could be welfare enhancing because it gives 
firms who have better information about the random shocks the flexibility of adjusting 
to shocks. However, since firms ignore the social damages, their adjustment may be 
suboptimal. Therefore, how a unitary permit regime performs relative to a no-banking 
regime depends on how much there is to gain from flexibility (the second term) relative 
to how severely firms' redistribution of permits differs from the social optimal (the first 
term). In other words, directly from (12), we have 
Proposition 2 A unitary bankable regime dominates a no-banking regime if 
7 Another way to think about this is that given total permits available, once firms know the shock in 
the first period and make their best guess about the shock in the second period, the permit prices in the 
two periods are given. Thus, when firms make their emission decisions, it is as if they face a fixed price. 
64 
( B u  -  D u )  E  [(1 + r)/i? - E  ( f i ° M ) ] 2  >  (A i  +  Ai )  ( r  A) 2  .  
For a unitary bankable regime to dominate a no-banking regime, the condition that 
the benefit function is steeper than the damage function is necessary but not sufficient. 
In particular, the covariance structure of the shocks are important. The more shocks 
are negatively correlated, the more likely that a unitary bankable regime will dominate 
a no-banking regime. 
Figure 2 illustrates a case where a unitary bankable regime dominates a no-banking 
regime. In the figure, the no-banking optimum requires that e"6 = e£6 = enb. In the first 
period, firms observe the realization of /z° > 0, and expect the shock in the second period 
to be E [/Jgl/i?] < 0. Then they distribute their emissions in the two periods as e^6 and e^6, 
s u c h  t h a t  e x p e c t e d  m a r g i n a l  b e n e f i t s  a r e  e q u a l i z e d  a c r o s s  t h e  t w o  p e r i o d s ,  i . e . ,  E  [ M B ]  +  
Hi = Since it turns out that abatement costs in the first period are very 
high and relatively low in the second, firms emit more in the first and correspondingly 
fewer in the second period. In the first period, to achieve the expected social optimal, 
which requires E [MB] + /z° = MD and the emissions would have 
been e\  and e^.  Without intertemporal trading, the social loss would be the areas of 
the two dotted triangles due to too few emissions in the first period and too many in 
the second. With intertemporal trading, the social loss would be the areas of the two 
bold-line bordered triangles because too many emissions in the first and too few in the 
second period. Neither regime attains e\ and e\. Which of the two is better depends on 
the slopes of the marginal benefit and damage functions and the covariance structure of 
the shocks. When the condition in proposition 2 are satisfied, the loss of a no-banking 
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regime is greater than a bankable permit system, as is shown in the figure. 
There is also an alternative interpretation for Figure 2. Compared to the no-banking 
regime, firms gain from additional emissions in the first period and lose due to reduced 
emissions in the second. The opposite is true in the damage side, there are more (fewer) 
damages in the first (second). In the figure, the benefit gain outweighs the increase in 
damages. 
Non-unitary Bankable Permit Regimes 
In this case, the regulator has two instruments to maximize social welfare. Instead of 
fixing 9 at zero, the regulator can choose both ë and 1+0, given Aet(ë, 9), to maximize 
social welfare. From Proposition 1, we know ë = e"6, or Aë = 0. 
Substituting (9) into (8), we get firms' demand for banking in a non-unitary bankable 
permit regime, 
Aef(ë.fl) = (r - «) B ,  + (1 + r) - (1+ 6 ) E  ^  I M?] (13a) 
[(1 + r) + (1 + 0)2] B„ 
A(£b(? m — C1 (r ~ Bl ~ C1 + r^ + + ^ E I z,oh\ 
~ [d + rj + d+fl)2] B n  •  ( U b )  
where the superscript "gb" means optimal solutions for a general bankable permit regime 
with optimally set ITR. Substituting these demand functions back into the welfare func­
tion, we get, 
A E [W^(ë"&, 9)] = AW®6(cB6, 9) + AW£(ënb, 0), with (14) 
AW9b(ënb 9) = ~ (Bn + Du) (0 ~ r)2Bf 
C ( 
' 
) 2(1+r) [(l + r) + (l + 0)2] B*n 
aw*i** «\ = (b" ~ du)e [(1 + r ) A  ~ (1 + 6)e (^°)]2 
"
c( 
' 
} 2(1 + r) [(1 + r) + (1 + 0)2] B2X 
where subscripts "c" and "uc" stand for certain and uncertain, respectively. By maxi­
mizing AE \Wgb(enb,9)\ with respect to 9, we can get the optimal 9, 9gb. The following 
proposition described the magnitude of the optimal 9 relative to r, 
Proposition 3 If the optimal 9gb exists, then, 
9 g b < r  i f ( B n - D n )  >0, 
9 g b > r  i f ( B n - D u )  < 0 ,  
9gb = r if (Bu — Dn) — 0. 
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. There is a trade-off in choosing the 
optimal 9. On the one hand, the value of 9 is set to correct firms' discounting behavior, 
i.e., 9 is set to obtain a higher value of AWgb(enb,9). This purpose can be best served 
by setting 9 = r. On the other hand, 9 is set to best utilize information on uncertainty, 
i .e . ,  to  maximize AWg b(ën b ,  9) .  Sett ing 9 = r in general  does not  maximize AWg b(en b ,  9) .  
If (Bu — Dn) > 0, we know from AWgb(ënb,0) the benefit gain from adjusting to un­
certainty dominates the increase in damage. Since benefits in the first period are more 
valuable than those in the second, it makes sense to have a small 9 to encourage first 
period emissions. A trade-off between maximizing the first and the second terms would 
require 9gb < r. If (Bu — Du) < 0, then the damage loss from adjusting to uncertainty 
dominates the benefit gain. Since second period damage is less valued than first period, 
the optimal policy should encourage permit saving and discourage borrowing. Thus a 
trade-off would require 9gb > r. If (Bu — Dn) = 0, then emissions in neither period are 
more beneficial than the other, so 9 is set to maximize just AWgb(enb,9) and 9gb = r. 
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We will next discuss the welfare levels of non-unitary bankable regime relative to 
unitary bankable regime and no-banking regime, given some value of 9. First, we have 
the following, 
Proposition 4 A bankable regime with 9 = r, ë = e"6 always weakly dominates a no-
banking regime given that (B\\ — Du) >0. 
The proof is trivial. Substituting 9 = r into AE \W9b(enb, 0)] , we get AE [W9 b(en b ,  0)] 
= AWj£(ënb, 9). If (Bn - Du) > 0, then AE [^(ê"6,0)] > 0. 
Since it may be hard to find the optimal 6 in reality, this finding may have very 
important practical implications. If we are not sure what the optimal 9 is, or just for 
simplicity, the regulator may set the interest rate on banked permits equal to the interest 
rate on monetary values. By doing so, she can be sure a bankable permit regime with 
ITR = 1+r still performs better than a no-banking regime. The intuition underlying this 
is that, by setting 0 = r, the regulator offsets firms' tendency of suboptimally distributing 
permits and provides firms the flexibility of adjusting emissions. Given that marginal 
benefit function is steeper, the benefit gain from adjusting to uncertainty outweighs the 
damage loss. Thus, setting 9 = r is welfare improving. 
Remark 3 An optimal bankable permit regime always weakly dominates a no banking 
regime if (Bn — D\\) > 0. 
The remark is a direct result of Proposition 4 given that a bankable permit regime 
with 9 = r, ë = e"b is not necessarily the optimal choice. This remark reconfirms one of 
the findings of Yates and Cronshaw (2001). 
Remark 4 Given {Bu ~ Du) > 0, a non-unitary bankable regime with 9 = r does not 
necessarily dominate a unitary bankable regime. 
If (Bn  — Du) > 0, the regime with IT R = 1 + r is always better than a no-banking 
regime while a unitary regime can be better than a no-banking regime. However, it 
is not easy to see which is better, since both of them are suboptimal settings. The 
answer depends on the structure of the benefit and damage functions and the covariance 
structure of the shocks. From (12) and (14), we expect the regime with IT R = 1 + r 
to be better if the optimal 9 is close to r, and the loss from not fully correcting firms' 
discounting behavior is big. 
From (12) and (14), we know, 
Remark 5 Ceteris paribus, the more shocks are negatively correlated, and/or the more 
they vary, the higher (lower) the welfare of a bankable permit regime if (Bu — Du) > 0 
({Bu — Du) < 0). However, the covariance structure of the shocks does not impact 
whether a bankable regime dominates a no-banking regime. 
It is easy to see that the value of [(l+r)2<rf—2(l+r)(H-0)<T12+(l+0)2<r||1] is higher, if 
/x° and fj.2 are negatively correlated. Intuitively, the flexibility provided by intertemporal 
trading has higher value if it turns out the abatement costs (potential benefits from 
permits for firms) are high in one period and low in another period. Otherwise, there is 
not much gain from emission smoothing for firms. When {Bn — Dn) >0, the gain for 
firms from banking outweighs the social loss from the damages of emissions. However, if 
(Bn — Dn) < 0, then the opposite is true. In this case, the more firms trade, the more 
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the damage from emissions, which outweighs firms' gain from trading. Thus, the more 
firms trade, the more the social loss. 
We have analyzed the case where the regulator does not know shocks in both periods 
when designing a permit regime while firms know the first period shock when making 
emissions decisions. We may consider the situation without asymmetric information, i.e., 
firms and the regulator have the same information, including: both sides know the shocks 
in each period, know the first period shock but not the second, or know the shocks in 
neither period. For the situation where firms have better information than the regulator, 
in addition to the case we have considered in previous sections, we may also consider the 
case where firms know the shocks of both periods while the regulator knows neither of 
them. For bankable permits in these various cases, we have the following remark, 
Remark 6 With or without uncertainty, if the regulator and firms have the same in­
formation about the shocks in the two periods, then the optimal B equals r and there is 
no welfare gain from banking. If firms have better information than the regulator, then 
whether there is a gain from banking depends on the slopes of the marginal benefit and 
damage functions, and the magnitude of gain or loss is increasing with the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
For a detailed explanation see the appendix. The motivation for the flexibility of 
trading permits across time is to let firms adjust to situations which they know better 
than the regulator. If firms have no better information than the regulator when they are 
making their emissions decisions, giving flexibility to them will not result higher welfare 
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and may well result in lower welfare since firms disregard the externality caused by their 
emissions. 
Conclusions 
This paper studies the design and efficiency of alternative bankable permit regimes. 
Similar to Yates and Cronshaw, we find that a necessary condition for banking to domi­
nate no banking is that the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal damage 
curve. When this necessary condition is satisfied, whether banking dominates no banking 
depends on the ITR. Two of our findings are of particular interest. 
One is related to bankable permit regimes with ITR=l+r. When the slope condition 
is satisfied, a bankable permit regime with total permits equal to the no banking optimum 
and ITR=l+r always dominates no banking. We consider this result interesting because 
it demonstrates that the design of a welfare improving bankable permit regime is no more 
complicated than the no banking regime. 
The other is related to bankable permit regimes with ITR=1. Previous studies (e.g. 
Rubin and Kling, 1997) have shown that such regimes are suboptimal. We find that this 
does not necessarily mean that a unitary bankable permit regime should never be used. 
As long as the flexibility of banking provides more benefit gains than damage losses, 
unitary banking dominates no banking. This case is more likely to be true when firms 
have big information advantage over the regulator about their benefits and benefits tend 
to be negatively correlated across time. We consider this result interesting because it 
says something of a permit regime which is often actually used. 
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Appendix 
Detailed explanation for Remark 2 The remark can be better explained by-
studying the decentralized permit trading market. For any firm i. the benefit maximiza­
tion problem is 
max £(ei,/4,/i°) + I ~ Pix\ ~ Y^P2X*2 
Such that e\ + ^ "^4 < ëi + + À + 4 > 0, 
where pt is the permit price in period t, and x\ is the amount of permits firm i buys 
from the market in period t. From the above problem, we can derive this firm's de­
mand for permits in each period as a function of permit prices, i.e., e\(pi, fi\, ni) and 
e\(P2i Pzi P2) with pi = l^pv Setting total demand for permits equal to the supply (the 
total amount of permits issued), we may obtain the equilibrium prices. Since are 
random variables, firms' demand for permits is also random. Also, the demand by firm i 
is independent of the demand by firm j, because fi\ are independent across firms for any 
given t. If ej(-) has finite variance, then by the law of large numbers, 
lim Pr 
n—»oc 
< £ = 1, where ct(pi, //°) is independent of firm 
specific shocks. 
Thus, the industry's demand for permits will be the same no matter what firm-specific 
shocks are in any given period. Given that the supply of permits is fixed, the industry's 
equilibrium emissions in each period will also be the same with probability one. 
Proof for Proposition 3 Differentiating the first term of AE [W96(ê"6,0)] with 
respect to 0, we know d^WcJ^e = 0 for 9 = r, and d^WcJ^ > 0 (< 0) for 9 < r 
72 
(> r). 
Proof. We next determine the sign of the derivative of the second term for 9 < r. 
Expanding the expectation in the second term, we get 
Aiygbtgnb n\  _  (Bu—Du) [(l+r)2t,ar(/x°)-2(l+r)(l+fl)COT,(^,fx°W(l+g)2t,qr(g(pt°|M°))) Djff 
^wu c(e  ,v)  - 2(i+r)6& [(1+r)+(1+fl)2j • ^meren-
tiating with respect to 9, we get 
d(AW?cb(e^,fl)) 
de 
= A* [(1 + r)var (r f)  -  var (E (a^K))  -  (2 f l^2 g~ r)  cm, (^,^2)] , 
= A*\E [var (a*M)] + ^(1+0>r~(20+g ~r)^ yar , (15) 
where A = and p is the correlation coefficient of n\ and In the 
second step, several relations are used, var(pf{)  = E [var (a^Ia4?)] + var{E (a^Ia1?)) and 
ccn
' (^1,^2) = fn,ar (A4?) » var(n°x) = var(n%). If 9 < r, then ^(1+e)r (2*+fl > q. 
Thus, for 9 € [0, r], sign ,g)^ = sign (A) = - sign (Bu - £>u). 
Consider the derivatives of the two terms together. If (Bn — D u )  =  0, then 
AE [W9b(enb,9)] = AWj?b(enb, 9), thus the optimal 9, 99b = r. If (Bn - Dn) > 0, 
then d(AtV"jgC < 0, for 9 € [0, r]. Given that 9 = r is the global maximum for 
AW9b(enb,9), we have 9gb < r, if 9gb exists. On the contrary, If (Bn — Du) < 0, then 
d(&wUc(e ,0)) > q for y ç [0, r], and so 9gb > r,if 096 exists. • 
Detailed explanation for Remark 6 (i) When the regulator and firms have the 
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same information By the definitions of Aet, and A E [W], we know 
A [W9b(ênb, 9)] = (Bl + *z°)Aef - (Aef6)' - D lAe l  - ±DU (Aef6)' + 
(B2 + i fyAéz — 5B11 ^Ae®6^ — DiAe^ — |Dn ^Aef6^ , 
= 2^-^y (Bu  + Du) [(1 + r)  + (1 + 9)2] (^ef6)  •  
The second step requires some explanation. We first show that the terms that are 
/x° is known to both parties, then B\ + fi® = D\ and (B% + ^2) = Di- These two 
equations are just the first order conditions for the optimal no-banking permit policies. 
When there is uncertainty, proper expectations have to be used in place of /4*. If only 
H*{ is known to both parties, then E (/i^l/^i) replaces /z". We will have B\ + n® = Di and 
(B2 + E (/ijl/J?)) = Di. If both $ and n% are unknown to both parties, then $ will be 
replaced by its expectation (zero) and we have B\ = D\ and B<i = D\. Rearranging the 
square terms using the relation Ae^ê, 9) = (1 + 0)Aef6(ë, 9), we will get the second line. 
E (//°K). Given than A [PKsl,(ê"6,0)] < 0, setting 9 = r maximizes it. 
(ii) When firms have better information Most of the analysis in previous sections 
deals with the case where the regulator does not know the shocks in both periods while 
firms know the shocks in the first but not that of the second. So here we will only 
analyze the case where the regulator still does not know the shock in either period while 
firms know the shocks in both periods. In this case, we say the degree of asymmetric 
information increases because firms' information has improved while the regulator's stays 
linear in Aef6 will vanish when the regulator and firms have the same information. If 
From (13a), we know minimized if 9 = r, since B\ + = Bo + 
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the same. When firms know the conditional expectation term in (8), E I Mi] will 
be replaced by fj%- And E[( 1 + r)fi(1 + 0)2? (^I^?)]2, ^ A£" [W^e"6,0)] will be 
replaced by £[(1 +r)/^ —(1+0)/^]2. Since E[(l + r)//^ — (1 +6)E (/i^l/^i)]2 —S[(l + r)^° 
—(1 + 0)a*2]2 = —°2 and rr||i —#r| < 0. we know E[(l + r)//° —(1 + 0)E (/z°Im?)]2 
< £[(1 + r)/j.1 —(1 + 0)//°]2. The second half of the remark follows directly from this. 
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Banking with ITR=1 and No Uncertainty 
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Banking with ITR=1 and Uncertainty 
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CHAPTER 4. 
GREEN PAYMENTS AND DUAL POLICY GOALS 
A paper to be submitted to 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the efficient design of green payments. Green payments may 
generate environmental benefits and support the income of small farmers. We find that 
if the government intends to achieve both of these two goals, then the decoupling of 
green payments and farm size is not optimal when information is limited. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of green payments critically depends on the correlation between conservation 
efficiency and farm size. 
Introduction 
Green payments, which are also called conservation payments or green support pro­
grams, are payments government provides for farmers for voluntarily maintaining or 
adopting conservation practices that enhance the environment, natural resources and 
wildlife habitat. As we move closer to the 2002 bill, which will replace the 1996 FAIR 
Act, we have seen increased interest in green payment programs. In May 2001, Senator 
Tom Harkin introduced in the Senate the Conservation Security Act, under which farm­
ers would receive payments for providing environmental services. A similar Act was also 
introduced in the house at the same time. There are two basic reasons for the strong 
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interest in green payments. 
First, it provides a foundation for farm support by society at large. Since Fiscal Year 
1998, $70 billion has flowed to agriculture either as "emergency aid" or aid automatically 
triggered by low prices (Babcock 2001). If agriculture is to continue to receive the direct 
payments it has been receiving in recent years, it is likely to need to provide more 
substantial justification for them (Babcock 2000, Claassen et al 2001). Paying farmers 
to maintain beneficial impacts of agriculture (such as rural landscape amenities, wildlife 
habitat) or to mitigate adverse environmental impacts (such as soil erosion, runoff form 
nutrient and pesticide) can be an appealing rationale for farm support (Potter 1998). 
Second, green payments can address agri-environmental problems that have not been 
adequately addressed. The Conservation Reserve Program and the Wetland Reserve 
Program provide environmental services by taking land out of production but do not 
have direct effects on land in production. Cost-share or incentive payment programs, 
such as Environmental Quality Incentive Program and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives 
Program, pay farmers for environment-friendly farming practices. However, when the 
cost share is less than 100 percent, farmers have no incentive to participate unless the 
targeted practices also provide private benefits. Further, Cox (2001) and Veneman (2001) 
provide evidence that there is demand for additional environmental management on land 
in production. Green payments are well positioned to meet such demands. 
Lynch and Smith (1994) argue "what distinguishes green support programs from most 
traditional agricultural conservation and environmental programs is that they would ex­
plicitly support participants' farm incomes at the same time they purchase environmental 
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benefits (page ii)". If green payments are to provide income support, they continue to 
argue green payment levels must exceed the private cost of taking environmental protec­
tion action (page iii). Horan, Shortle and Abler (1999) also suggest that green payments 
can provide a degree of income support if they more than cover the costs of providing 
the required environmental services. 
Despite the strong interest shown for green payments, they are often just discussed 
but seldom analyzed as policy instruments (Heimlich and Claassen, 1998). While Wu and 
Babcock (1995, 1996) provide excellent analyses of the optimal design of green payments 
programs, income support is not considered as a goal of such programs. Claassen et al. 
(2001) provide some empirical evidence on how green payments may meet the dual goals 
of environmental protection and income support. They show that targeting payments 
to support the incomes of any specific group of farmers is unlikely to solve any given 
agri-environmental problem, and that targeting any specific agri-environmental problem 
may exclude many producers that qualify for income support. 
In this paper we analyze the efficient design of green payments programs explicitly 
considering dual policy goals. Formally, we represent the two policy goals as two compo­
nents in the policymaker's objective function. We begin by noting in a setting where the 
government is unrestricted in the set of variables that are contractible, efficient program 
design requires targeting policies to each type of farm and green payments can achieve 
its dual goals. 
However, in practice it may be difficult to observe the true cost of engaging in conser­
vation activities for a given farmer. Likewise, it may be politically infeasible to contract 
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directly on farm size. These two potential noncontractibilities affect the feasible design of 
a green payments program. To model these noncontractibilities as constraints, we extend 
our analysis by adopting a mechanism design framework (e.g., Bourgeon and Chambers, 
2000) where farm operations are characterized by two parameters: one representing con­
servation efficiency, and the other farm size. 
We first examine the case when only farm size is contractible; this allows us to analyze 
welfare losses from the government's inability to contract directly on farm size. We find 
that for any farm size, relatively more efficient farmers obtain whatever income support 
the least conservation efficient farmers obtain. This is a direct result of incomplete 
information: farmers can always present themselves as any conservation type that brings 
them the highest payment. Thus, if large farmers also tend to be conservation efficient, 
providing them income support is unavoidable. Moreover, since the policymaker knows 
that on average farmers get positive rent and every farmer gets at least the income 
support of the least efficient farmer, net payments for the least (most) efficient farmers 
will be lower (higher) than in the complete information case. The policymaker adjusts 
payments to equalize the marginal cost of income support with its expected marginal 
benefit. 
We next examine the case where both farm size and conservation efficiency are non-
contractible but where the policymaker still wants to use a single policy instrument. 
Since the policymaker can no longer target a specific farm size, the policymaker has to 
rely on the correlation of conservation efficiency and farm sizes to make green payments 
more effective as an income support tool. Specifically, if small farmers also tend to be 
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conservation efficient, it is better to pay conservation efficient farmers more than their 
conservation costs, since these extra payments will also act as income support for them. 
On the contrary, if small farmers tend to be conservation inefficient, then conservation 
inefficient farmers should be paid relatively more. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We lay out the basic elements of 
the model in the next section. In the third section, we examine green payments with 
complete information. Section 4 analyzes the situation when green payments can be 
targeted at small or large farmers, but conservation efficiency is private information. In 
the fifth section, we study the optimal design of green payments when both farm size 
and conservation efficiency are not contractible. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
Model Setup 
Farmers produce two types of goods: a market good q and an environmental good e. 
The market good generates revenue pq, where p is the market price of output. There is 
no market for the environmental good. It is costly to provide a positive level of e, so e 
equals zero in the absence of any external conservation incentives. 
Farmers are characterized by two variables: farm size <j> and conservation efficiency 
9. For simplicity, we assume <f) and 9 have two levels: 4> € $ = {0^, <ps} and 9 € 0 = 
{#/!, 9i) . We denote their joint and marginal distributions as P,_,, P,, and Pj, respectively, 
where x 9j G $ x ©. The two variables may be correlated. For example, positive 
correlation may occur if large farmers may be able to adopt conservation practices more 
efficiently because they have efficient management. Negative correlation may also occur 
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if small farmers can achieve large environmental benefits at relatively low cost because 
their land is very environmentally sensitive. 
Denote the cost function of providing e and q as c(q, e; 0, 0), then a higher 0 is as­
sociated with lower total and marginal costs for a given level of e and q, i.e., cy(-) < 0, 
Cefl(-) < 0. Following Bourgeon and Chambers (2000), the difference between smaller and 
larger farmers is assumed to be purely technical with larger farmers having everywhere 
lower marginal costs of production than smaller farmers, or formally, c^(-) < 0, c^( ) < 0. 
Let 7r(e; 0, 0) = max {pq — c(q, e; 0,9 ) }  be a farmer's profit given that she provides 
<7 
e. When no conservation services are provided, farmers with the same 0 are assumed to 
have the same cost, then we have tt(0; 0,0/) = tt(0; 0,0/J. That is, when e = 0, small (or 
large) farmers have the same profit regardless of their conservation efficiency. Moreover, 
tt(0; 0S, 0) < tt(0; 0l, 0). For income support to be relevant, we assume there is a target 
income fr, deemed desirable for a farmer by the policymaker, with 7r(0; 0s, 0) < ir, and 
tt(0; 4>h, 0) > 7f, where 0 G 0. Thus, small farmers do not achieve the target income even 
with zero environmental services, while large farmers do. 
The policymaker intends to make transfers to farmers as incentives for the provision 
of environmental benefits and as a way of supporting farmers whose status quo income is 
below 7f. We refer to such transfers as green payments and denote them as £(0^0,). The 
"non-market" benefits the policymaker derives from supporting small farmers' income 
are represented as w(y), with 
w ( y )  =  <  
™ ( y ) ,  i f  V  <  i r ,  
(1) 
0, if y > 7r, 
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where y is a farmer's income which is the sum of profits and green payments, i.e., y = 
7r(e;0, B) + tfâ^Bj); w is concave with wy > 0, wyy < 0 and wy{y) = 0. Thus, the 
policymaker only derives utility from supporting small farmers. The closer a farmer's 
income is to the parity income, the less benefit the policymaker derives from supporting 
them. Once a farmer's income exceeds the parity income, the policymaker will not want 
to support her any more. 
Social surplus from farming consists of two parts: farmers' profit tt(-) and environ­
mental improvement. The social benefit of environmental improvement is denoted as 
v(e) with v' > 0, v" < 0. In a green payments program, the policymaker's problem is to 
choose levels for the environmental benefit and green payments to maximize the sum of 
social surplus and the "non-market" benefits from income support, minus the social cost 
of funding green payments. Funds for green payments are usually financed with some sort 
of distortionary tax. We denote the unit deadweight loss from such distortion as A > 0, 
that is, for each dollar given to farmers, the social cost is A dollars due to efficiency loss. 
An alternative explanation for A is that it is the multiplier of the policymaker's budget 
constraint. 
We will model green payments program as a truthful direct revelation mechanism 
[e(0i? Bj), t(0i50j)]. With such mechanism, the government offers farmers a menu of 
conservation levels and green payments and farmers can pick any one choice from the 
menu. This way of modelling enables us to focus on the main subject of this paper which 
is how green payments achieve the dual goals. In the next three sections, we will see 
that the policymaker's optimal decisions depend not only on farm sizes and conservation 
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efficiency but also on how much information she has and can base policies on. Before we 
proceed, we list below the definitions of a few terms to avoid confusion, 
Definition 1 In a green payments program, the income y(<j>, 9) for a farmer of type 
( 0 , 9 )  i s  t h e  s u m  o f  h e r  p r o f i t s  7 r ( e ;  0 ,  9 )  a n d  g r e e n  p a y m e n t s .  T h e  n e t  p a y m e n t  r ( 0 , 9 ) ,  i s  
the transfer that is over and above her profit loss due to the provision of environmental 
services e, i.e., 
y(4>,9) = 7T (e;0,0)+£(0^), (2) 
T(<£>,0) = t(<f>, 9) - [TT(0; 0,9) - TT (e, 0, 0)] 
= Z/(07#) — tt(O;0,0). (3) 
Green Payments With Complete Information 
To design a green payments program with complete information, the policymaker can 
specify levels of e and t for each farmer to maximize net social surplus and the non-market 
benefits from supporting small farmers, i.e., 
max Y.i Zj Ne(0v d i ) )  +  7 r ( e ( 0 i ,  O j )  +  w  (y(0i7 9 j ) )  -  A«(0^ 9 j ) \  P ^ ,  (4a) 
s.t. y(0i,0,) > v ^ x ^ $ x 9. (4b) 
The constraint requires voluntary participation since it is in general politically infeasible 
to require farmers to provide environmental services without compensation. By (1), for 
large farmers, w (y) =0 and for small farmers, w (y) is a concave function, w(y). The 
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optimal e(-), and £(•) are characterized below, 
ye(ê(<Ai,0j)) = -(1 + A)7Te 0 j ) ;  ^ j ) ,  (5a) 
i(4>L, Oj) = tt(0; éL, O j )  - 7re (ê(0L, 6 j ) \  4 > L , 9 j ) , (5b) 
A = wt [i(<ps,0j) + ir(ê(<t>s,0j);<t>s, 0 j ) \  ,  (5c) 
where indicates the optimal green payments program with complete information. The 
marginal condition (5a) requires that marginal benefit equals marginal cost for conserva­
tion, which is the lost profit for providing conservation services. The optimal conditions 
for green payments to small and large farmers are different. In particular, large farmers' 
green payments just cover their conservation costs while small farmers' green payments 
are such that the marginal benefit from income support equals the marginal cost of trans­
fer. If A < wt(7r(0; 05,0j)), which we assume to be the case, then we will have £(05,6j) > 
tt(0; 05, Oj)— 7T(ê(05,0j); 05,0j), that is, it is desirable for the policymaker to boost small 
farmers' income. 
Remark 1 With complete information, we have a separation of income support and 
conservation efficiency: a farmer's conservation level only depends on her conservation 
efficiency and her net payment only depends on her need for income support. 
Since the policymaker does not care about income support for large farmers, their 
conservation payments just cover their cost. However, for small farmers, their average net 
payments are positive because the policymaker is concerned with boosting their income. 
Remark 2 With complete information, green payments can achieve its dual policy goals 
efficiently by 
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(1) specifying e for each farmer such that the margined benefit from conservation equals 
its marginal cost; 
(2) compensating farmers' conservation services not only according to their conser­
vation efficiency but also according to farm size. 
This result provides the base case for comparing the more realistic situation when 
one or both of the parameters are not contractible. 
Green Payments With 0 Contractible But 0 Not 
We turn now to the case where the policymaker may not always know farmers conser­
vation efficiency. For example, how the adoption of conservation tillage affects a farmer's 
profit depends on many factors: natural resource endowments of the field, weather con­
ditions, the farmer's years of experience and days of off-farm work, and what kind of 
equipment the farmer already has, etc. Although past studies (Chambers 1992, Bour­
geon and Chambers 2000, and Hueth 2000) suggest that the policymaker may not be 
able to explicitly discriminate between small and large farmers, we study the case with 
0 contractible for two reasons. First, farm size, which can be measured by production 
acres, animal numbers, etc., is potentially targetable. Second, if targeting farm size is 
not feasible, it is interesting to understand the efficiency loss due to the policymaker's 
inability to target farm size. 
If farm size is contractible, the policymaker can design policies for small and large 
farmers separately. Thus, we first discuss optimal green payments for large farmers and 
then discuss those for small farmers. 
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For Large Farmers 
Since the policymaker is not constrained to support this group of farmers' income, her 
problem is to choose a menu of conservation levels and the corresponding green payments 
to maximize net social surplus, 
max Y,j [v(e(<l>L, ej)) + 0j) - At((<?>L, 0,)] P L j  (6a) 
s.t. 7T (e(0L, Gj), <t>L,dj) + 0j) > 7r(0; <f>L, Bj), (6b) 
v(e(4>L>Oj)i4>Li0j) +t(<t>L,9j) > 7r(e(0£,0fc),0L,07) + t(4>L,9k), (6c) 
where B j ,  0 k  G 0. The first set of constraints are the individual rationality constraints 
(IRs) for type (<£,-, Oj), which we denote as (IRij). The IRs ensure that farmers' partic­
ipation in the program is voluntary. By the revelation principle, an optimal mechanism 
requires truth-telling: for farmers to tell the truth, doing so has to maximize their in­
come. This is specified by (6c), the incentive compatibility constraints (ICs) for type 
(<i>i,dj), which we denote as (ICij). 
We can rewrite the problem as a two-stage problem, 
max [v(e(<f>L, 9j)) + 7r(e(0L,0,)] PLj + z*L (e{<f>L, 0,),e{(j>L,6h)), (7) 
where z*L (•) = max |zL (•) = -A K(4>L^i)pLj • (6b) and (6c)} . 
In the first stage, the optimal green payments are obtained for given conservation services 
and in the second stage the optimal conservation services are determined. Since this is 
a standard one-dimensional adverse selection model, we will not discuss it in detail. 
However, for comparison with other cases, we present a graphical solution to the first 
stage optimization. 
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In Figure 1, we depict all of the relevant constraints. Since ( IR l h )  will be satisfied if 
(IRli) and (IC^h) are, only (IRu) is drawn. The green payments that satisfy (ICth) are 
along the line IClk and the area above it, and those satisfying (ICli) are along the line 
ICu and the area below it. So, the green payments that satisfy both IRs and ICs are the 
shaded area. Graphically (•) is a negatively-sloped line. Thus, the lowest point in the 
shaded area in Figure 1 is the unique point that satisfies both constraints and maximizes 
Zl (•). In the second stage, the optimal conservation levels are solved by substituting 
the optimal green payments into (7) and then maximizing with respect to e(0L, #/,) and 
e(4>L,0t). 
Proposition 1 For any given {e{<j>L, 0[), e(0L, 0/,)} , the solution to the first stage of (7) 
can be characterized as, 
=tt(0;4>L, 0 i )  - w ( e ( < f > L , 0 i ) ; ( f ) L , O l ) ,  (8a) 
t*(4>li Oh) = tt(0; <pL,0h) -ir{e(<t>L,0h);<j>L,0h) + I(e{4>L,0t)), (8b) 
The solution to the second stage of (7) can be characterized as, 
ve(e*(<t>LiOh)) = -(1 + A)7Te (e*(0£.,0/t);0L,0/l), (9) 
ve(e'(4>L,0t)) = -(1 + AK (e*(0^,0z);0L,0z) + A/e(e*(0L,0z))^, (10) 
where, /(e) = ir (e; 0,0 h )  — tt (e; 0,9 t ) . 
Here indicates the optimal green payments program when farm size is targetable. 
From (8a) and (8b), we can obtain the net payments to each conservation type, 
r*(06,#f) = 0, T*(<t>L,0h) = I{e*{4>L,0i)). 
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We see that there is now no longer a separation of net payments and conservation effi­
ciency: among large farmers, the net payments to conservation inefficient farmers is zero, 
while the net payments to conservation efficient farmers is the information rent they earn. 
The results on conservation levels are standard: there is no distortion for the conser­
vation efficient type, but the conservation level for the conservation inefficient type has 
to be adjusted down according to the information rent /(•). The probability ratio, 
is the hazard rate. The larger is, the larger the effect of information rent will be for 
any given level of e. In other words, when there are relatively more conservation efficient 
large farmers, the conservation service by conservation inefficient large farmers will be 
more expensive because more farmers can receive information rent. 
For Small Farmers This case is different from the previous case because here the policy­
maker is concerned with boosting farmers' income. Otherwise the two problems are the 
same, 
max Ne(0s> 0j)) + ?r(05,d j )  + w(y(<f>s, dj)) - At(4>s, dj)] PSj (11a) 
s.t. 7r (e(0s, dj), 0S, dj) + t(<f)s, 0j) > tt(0; 0s, dj), (lib) 
7r(e(<t>s,0j),<f>s,Oj) + t(<j>s,0j) > n {e{4>s,0k), <t>s,0j) + t(0s,5*), (11c) 
where dj, dk G 0. The policymaker may not want to push the left hand side of (lib) to 
the lower bound due to its presence in the objective function. The incentive constraints 
are essentially the same as the case for large farmers. 
93 
We again rewrite the problem as a two-stage optimization problem: 
max Y,j b(e(0S' dj)) + 0j)\ Psj + z*s (e(0s, 0 t ) ,  e(0s, 0h)), (12) 
where z% (•) = max {zs (•) : (lib) and (11c)} , 
and zs (•) = Ej [w(y(0g, d j ) )  - A£(0S, 6,)] PSj. 
This problem is the same as (7) except that here the "non-market" benefits from 
income support are added to the objective function of the first stage. The solution to 
the first stage optimization is illustrated in Figure 2 and more details are provided in 
the appendix. The IR and IC constraints are the same as those in Figure 1. However, 
while in Figure 1 the isoquant for zL (•) is a straight line, here the isoquant for zs (•) is 
a concave curve due to the curvature of w (•). The green payments that would maxi­
mize zs (•) without constraints (llb)-(llc) are denoted as t° (= {£°(0S, #/), t°(4>s,#&)}). 
If t° is below the feasible set1, i.e., the shaded area, then the optimal green payments 
{t*(<ps, $i), 6h)} must satisfy f{<f>s,dh) > t°(<t>s,&h). By the definition of zs (•), we 
also know that t*((f)s,di) < £°(0S, 9{). Otherwise, we can increase the value of zs (•) by 
reducing t(<ps, 0t) and keeping t(<ps, 6h) unchanged. Thus, the optimal green payments lie 
to the northwest of t°. As we move further away from t° in the northwest direction, the 
1 There are three possible locations for t°, below, in, or above the feasible set. We consider the first 
case because it is the most likely case. Conservation inefficient farmers have high cost of conservation, 
so relatively more green payments have to be provided for them to provide conservation services. Thus, 
when the optimal green payments (t°) are designed without regard to incentive compatibility constraints, 
conservation efficient farmers would have incentive to misrepresent themselves, i.e., t° lies below the 
feasible set. The other two cases could be similarly analyzed. 
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value of zs (•) decreases. The green payments that maximize zs (•) are the tangent point 
between zs (•) and the feasible set. Solving for the green payments at the tangent point 
and then using them to solve the second stage of (12), we get the following proposition, 
Proposition 2 For any given {e(<ps, #/), e(os, #/,)}, the solution to the first-stage opti­
mization of (12) satisfies 
A = u/t(t/*(0s, + wt(y'(<t>si0i))~i^i (13a) 
t*{<t>S idh) = 7r(O;0sA) -7r(e(<f>s ,Oh);<i>s ,0h) + l(e(<t>s ,0i)) + T*(<t>s ,O l),  (13b) 
f(4>s,0i) =tt(0;<(>s,di) - ir(e(<ps,dh);(l)s,di) + r*(0s,0/). (13c) 
The solution to the second-stage optimization of (12) satisfies 
"e(E*(< j>s,Oh)) = -(1 + A)7Te (e*(05,9h); <p s ,  Oh), (14) 
ve{e*{4>s, 6i)) = -(1 + A)ttc (e*(0s, 0/); 0S, 0Z) + [A - wt(y*(<t>s, 0^))] /e(e*(0s, 0f))%-
(15) 
From (13b)-(13c) and the individual rationality constraints, we have, 
T*(<M) > 0, re(0sA) = /(e*(0S,0Z)) + T*(0S,0Z). 
Remark 3 Conservation efficient small farmers ' net payment is the sum of information 
rent and income support for conservation inefficient small farmers. Just because a farmer 
gets information rent does not mean her income support should be less than those who 
do not get any information rent. 
This is a direct result of asymmetric information: by definition, information rent 
is due to private information which the policymaker cannot make use of. The income 
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support levels y*{<t>s,0h) and y'(4>s,&i) are chosen such that marginal cost of income 
support equals its expected marginal benefit. From (5c) and (13a) we know, for dj G 0, 
Pçl Pa, 
™ t(y(4>s, Oj)) = A = w t(y*(4>s ,  Oh))— + w t{y*{4>s ,  0i))-p-- (16) 
rs r's 
Since y*(0s,0h) > we have the following remark, 
Remark 4 When conservation cost is not known and income support can be targeted 
at small farmers, the income of conservation efficient small farmers is higher and the 
income of conservation inefficient small farmers is lower than the complete information 
case, i.e., y*{<t>s,Qh.) > 2/(05, Oh), and y*(<t>s,&i) < y(05,9i), or in terms of net payments, 
t*(0sA) > r(<t>s,0h), and r*(0s, 9{) < f(0s,0z). 
Intuitively, the policymaker knows that conservation efficient small farmers receive 
information rent in addition to income support which is the net payment for conser­
vation inefficient small farmers. Thus, if she makes marginal benefit from supporting 
conservation inefficient small farmers equal to marginal cost, A, then marginal benefit 
from supporting conservation efficient small farmers will be lower than marginal cost, 
which is not optimal. So she will reduce conservation inefficient small farmers' income 
support to equalize the expected marginal benefit and marginal cost of income support. 
Remarks 3 and 4 imply one important policy consequence of green payments when 
farm size is contractible but conservation cost is not: conservation efficient small farmers 
will receive excessive (comparing to first best) net payments, while conservation inefficient 
small farmers will receive inadequate net payments. 
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The condition for the conservation level of the efficient type, (14), is standard. Equa­
tion (15) differs from (10) by an additional term, —wt(y*((frs, 0/,))/e(-)-^-, which is due 
to the effect of information rent on income support. Now information rent has two im­
pacts. On the one hand, it increases the cost of conservation by conservation inefficient 
small farmers, i.e., A/c(-)-^-, which is the effect in standard adverse selection models 
and which we refer to as cost effect; on the other hand, it boosts conservation efficient 
small farmers' income, i.e., wt(y'(<ps,9h))Ie(-)lp^, which we refer to as income effect. 
Cost effect is not desirable for the policymaker while income effect is. How asymmetry 
of information will affect conservation inefficient small farmers' conservation level de­
pends on the magnitudes of income and cost effects. If [A — wt(y*{4>s,0fJ)] > 0, 
then cost effect dominates and e*(05, 6{) will be less than the first best level. If the 
opposite is true, then income effect dominates, and e*(0s, 8t) will be higher than the 
first best. Since y*(0s,0/i) > %/*(0g,#;), equation (13a) implies A — wt{y*{<t>siQh)) > 0. 
Also, from the definition of /(•), we know /e(e) = ire(e;<t>,6h) —ire(e;<f>,9t) > 0. Thus, 
[A — ivt(y*(<t>s,0h))]le(-)*p^ > 0, i.e., cost effect always dominates. In summary, 
Remark 5 When the policymaker derives utility from supporting small farmers' in­
come, information rent has two effects: cost effect, A/e(e*(0s, and income ef­
fect, wt{y*{0i,Tri))Ie{e*(<t)s,Qi))!^. In the case where income is contractible but conser­
vation cost is not, cost effect always dominates income effect, and so we always have 
e*(0s> 0/) < ®(0s,0/). 
The intuition that cost effect always dominates is as follows. When income support 
can be targeted at small farmers, conservation efficient small farmers receive excessive 
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income support, and the marginal benefit firom supporting them is less than the marginal 
cost (A). Thus A—wt(y*{<j)s, d^)) > 0, that is an extra unit of conservation by conservation 
inefficient small farmers incurs more information cost than its contribution to income 
support. 
Green Payments With Both é and 0 Uncontractible 
When policies discriminating between small and large farmers are not politically fea­
sible, the policymaker can no longer use policies that directly target farm sizes. Instead, 
she will have to explicitly treat all farmers the same. That is, farmers who provide the 
same level of conservation services will have to be paid the same regardless of their sizes. 
However, the policymaker may still design mechanisms that make farmers reveal their 
conservation efficiency truthfully. Thus, her problem is still to maximize social surplus 
plus the non-market benefits firom income support subject to the individual rationality 
and incentive compatibility constraints, i.e., 
max Y,, v(e(dj)) + * (e(0j); Qj) + w {y{<j>s, dj)) ^  - Xt{0j) Pj (17a) 
e
' L V7 
S t. 7r(e(#j);<^,#j) +((#_;) > 7r(0;<&,#j), (17b) 
7r (e(07); &, d j )  + t ( d j )  >  tt (e(<9fc); d j )  +  t ( 0 k ) ,  (17c) 
where 6 $, d j ,  d k  € 0, and 7r ( e ( d j ) ; d j )  =  ^  j g - i r  ( e ( d j ) ; ( f > i , d j ) , which is the average 
i n c o m e  o f  f a r m e r s  w i t h  c o n s e r v a t i o n  e f f i c i e n c y  d j .  
Although (17a)-(17c) look very similar to (lla)-(llc), they have a few important 
differences. The parameter 4> does not appear in e(-) and £(-), because it is no longer tar-
getable. For the same reason, the probability term Psj outside of the square brackets in 
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(lia) is replaced by P, in (17a). The ratio ^ in the square brackets gives us the propor­
t i o n  o f  s m a l l  f a r m e r s  a m o n g  t h o s e  w i t h  c o n s e r v a t i o n  e f f i c i e n c y  O j .  T h e n ,  w  ( y ( 4 > s ,  O j ) )  
in the objective function is the expected benefits firom income support for conservation 
type Oj. 
Before we characterize the optimal green payments program when farm size is not 
targetable and conservation efficiency is not known, we introduce one assumption to 
simplify analysis. 
Assumption 1: ce^ (e, q; 0,9) = 0. 
The assumption assumes that marginal cost of conservation is independent of farm 
size, that is, conservation efficiency 9 solely determines the marginal cost of conservation. 
The assumption is reasonable for the following reasons. First, we can always define 9 in 
such a way that it ranks farmers' relative conservation efficiency regardless of the value of 
0. Second, the notion that large farmers may be more efficient or otherwise is captured by 
the correlation between 0 and 9. Third, when the assumption does not hold, the analysis 
and results will be similar, although a different set of constraints may become binding. 
There are two participation and incentive constraints for each 0 6 However, with 
assumption 1, the constraints for small and large farmers with the same conservation 
efficiency either both hold or both do not hold. Formally, since = —c^ = 0, we know 
[tt (e(0f), <t>L,9)~ 7T (e(9j), 0L, 9)\-[ir (e(0f), 0S, 9)—rr (e(0,-), 0S, 9)] = /J* tt0 (e(0t), 0,9) -
ir$ (e{9j), 0,9) d9 = 0. Thus, for 0, , 0fc € and 9 G ©, if (IR,s) holds, then (IRfc0) must 
also hold. Likewise, if (IC,@) holds, then (IC^e) must also hold. Therefore, in the follow­
i n g ,  w e  w i l l  j u s t  u s e  6 ,  i m p l y i n g  i t  c o u l d  e i t h e r  b e  ( 0 L ,  9 )  o r  ( 0 S ,  9 ) .  
The two-stage version of (17) is as follows, 
max^V Ke(0_,)) + n ( e ( 0 j ) , 0 j ) ]  P j  + z" ( e ( 0 l ) , e ( 0 h ) )  
where z** (-) = max {z (•) : (17b) and (17c)} , 
(18) 
and z(-) = 53, w 0j)) ~Sr ~ At(0j) 
V7 
Because of the similarity between (12) and (18), we can use the same procedures in 
the previous section. The graphics for the first stage optimization of the two problems 
look almost the same except the differences in the labels. Thus we will state the solution 
to (18) without further discussion on their derivations. 
Proposition 3 The solutions to the first stage of (18) can be characterized as follows, 
X — Ps 
t " ( 0 h )  =tt(0;<M/.) -Tr{e"(Oh)-<t>,0h) + /(e"(0,)) + r"(0t), 
t " ( 0 t )  = tt(0; 0,0 i )  -  7T ( e m ' ( 0 i ) ;  0,0 , )  + 
The solution to the second stage of (18) satisfies 
(19a) 
(19b) 
(19c) 
v e ( e " ( 0 h ) )  =  -(1 + X)7Te (e~(0h);4>,0h), (20) 
»«(e"(«i)) = -(1 + A)irc («'•(#,);*,»,) + [a - (21) 
Here "**" indicates the optimal green payments program when both 0 and 0 are 
not targetable. Equation (19a) requires the marginal cost of income support equals its 
expected marginal benefit. Equations (13a) and (19a) are the same except the additional 
term P5 in (19a), which is the proportion of small farmers. The additional term is due 
100 
to the policymaker's inability to target income level. The term in the brackets is the 
expectation of marginal benefits firom supporting small farmers' income. Multiplying it 
by Ps gives us the expectation of marginal benefit firom income support when both 4> 
and 6 are not contractible. 
From (13a) and (19a), we have 
wt{y**(<t>si9h))-£ç + Wt(y**(<t>si0i))~ïç 
= 
= 
wt(y'(4>s^h))-p^- + wt(y*(<t>s,0i))-j^-
The first and the last expressions are the averages of marginal benefit from different 
levels of income support. Define the average income support as the weighted average of 
income support for the two conservation types. Then, by the concavity of w(-), we have 
the following remark, 
Remark 6 For the case where conservation efficiency is not contractible, when wt(-) 
is linear (i.e., w(-) is quadratic), average income support is higher when farm size is 
contractible than when it is not. 
The intuition is that, when farm size is not contractible, income support becomes more 
expensive because part of it will be "wasted" on large farmers whose income support does 
not generate benefit. As a result, the marginal benefit of income support is lower relative 
to the case where green payments can target farm size. Thus, average income support is 
decreased to equalize the marginal benefit and marginal cost of transfer. 
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From equations (19b) and (19c), we can derive the net payments to each conservation 
type of farmers, 
r"(<Mi) > 0, r"(<t>,Oh) = /(e"(0z))+r**(e"(0z),0z). 
Thus, in a dual goal green payments program, farmers who have high conservation 
efficiency benefit the most, while farmers who have low conservation efficiency benefit 
the least. 
Remark 7 In the case where neither farm size nor conservation efficiency is contractible, 
a green payments program is most effective as a tool of income support when small farmers 
also tend to be conservation efficient. 
As to the optimal conservation level, (20) says that there is no distortion for efficient 
farmers' conservation level. Equation (21) differs firom (15) by two terms, both of which 
are due to the poUcymaker's inabihty to target farm size. The first is the additional term 
in the square brackets, and the second is the replacement of ^ by When farm 
size is not contractible, the policymaker can only take expectations of marginal benefit 
of income support for any conservation type. The term is the probability that a 
farmer is small given that she is conservation efficient. Multiplying marginal benefit by 
gives us the expected marginal benefit firom conservation efficient farmers. Also, the 
policymaker cannot use the relative proportion of a conservation type within either small 
or large farmers, and so ^ is replaced by 
From (19a), we have wt(y**(<t>s,6h)) < < wt(y'*(4>s,6i)), so A > wt(y"(<t>s,0h)) 
if PshJPh < 1. If Ps*/Ph > then there is an interval between and and A—. If 
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wt(y**(<t>s,0/i))falls into this interval, then A < ^Liyt(y"(0s,9 h ) ) -
Remark 8 If PspsPh < 1, then cost effect dominates income effect. If Psp^Ph > 1, and 
wt{y**{<t>si0h)) € |a-^-, A^], then income effect dominates. 
The term, PstpPh, is the ratio of proportion of conservation efficient small farmers 
to the proportion of all small farmer. The above remark basically says when small 
farmers also tend to be conservation efficient, income effect is more likely to dominate; 
otherwise, cost effect is more likely to dominate. So, the joint distribution of 0 and 6, 
especially, the correlation between these two parameters is very important in determining 
the conservation level for conservation inefficient farmers, information rent received by 
conservation efficient farmers, and the total income for each group. In particularly, we 
have the following remark, 
Remark 9 For given Pi, Ps, and Pc, i.e., for given marginal distributions of<f> and 
9, 
(i) e**{9i) increases with Psh,' 
(ii) Information rent increases with Psh,' 
(Hi) y**(<t> s , 9 i )  d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  Psh-
For a proof, see appendix. From (21), ceteris paribus, we know the higher is, the 
more likely income effect will dominate, and the higher e**(9i) will be. In other words, 
when conservation efficient farmers also tend to be small farmers, they will provide more 
conservation service. This is because, the information rent received by them acts as 
income support, which may offset part or all of its cost effect. Remark (ii) directly comes 
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from (i). As e"(9i) increases, conservation efficient farmers will have a greater incentive 
to pretend as inefficient farmers. Greater information rent is provided to counteract this 
incentive. As conservation efficient farmers receive more information rent, they drag 
down the expected marginal benefit of income support and make income support more 
expensive. As a result, less payments go to conservation inefficient small farmers. 
Conclusions 
This paper provides answers to the question how green payments programs may 
meet the dual goal of environmental protection and income support. Given that the 
government provides payments to farmers for conservation services, it makes sense to 
pay farmers more than just their conservation costs so as to boost their income. Thus, 
green payments appear to be able to achieve the dual goals efficiently. This is the case 
when there is complete information. 
When there is asymmetric information, things are different. First of all, if the gov­
ernment does not know farmers' conservation costs, which is generally true, it cannot 
decide how much green payments should be. In such situations, farmers who can do 
conservation at a lower cost will benefit more from such a program. If large farmers who 
are not supposed to receive income transfer are also more conservation efficient, then it 
is unavoidable that they will benefit more from a green payments program. 
Second, if means test cannot be used, every farmer's green payments will have to 
exceed her conservation cost. Inevitably, farmers who are not intended to benefit from 
green payments, namely large farmers, will derive benefit from them. Since the budget 
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for green payments is limited, the income support for small farmers will be affected. 
Thus, with limited information or targeting tools, how green payments can achieve the 
dual goals hinges on the overlapping of small farmers and conservation efficient farmers. 
Green payments are likely to be more efficient when small farmers also tend to be more 
conservation efficient. 
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Appendix 
Details on Figure 2 and the solution to first-stage optimization of (12) 
Proof. By the definition of z$ (•), we know the green payments that maximize zs(-) 
without any constraints satisfy 
Wt(Tr(e(<j>s,9[);<t)s,0i) +t°(05,9z)) = A = wt(ir{e((j>s,0h); <t>s,0h) + t°((j>s,0,,)), 
that is, the marginal benefit of income support equals the marginal cost for either 
conservation type. As we discussed in the text, if t° is below the feasible set, then the 
optimal green payments in the feasible set must he to the northwest of t°, that is among 
those payments satisfying 
O h )  >  t ° ( é s , 0 h )  and t(<ps,0i) < *°(0S,0Z). (22) 
We can totally differentiate z $  (•) = 53, [ w ( y ( ( p s ,  9 j )) — X t ( é s ,  0 j ) ]  P s j ,  for green pay­
ments satisfying (22), we get 
dt(<f>s,0h) = PSi - [wt(y(0s, 0i)) - A] 
dt(<t>s,0i) Psh [wt(y(<j>ST0h)) ~ A] 
d <(05? Oh.) _ Psi uitc(y(<t><;,ûh))\uJt(y(<t><;,0i))—M-u>tt(y(<!><;,Oi))\wt(y(é<;,Oh))— \^ / Q 
dt2(0s,0z) Psh K(y(0sA))-A]a 
The above derivatives indicate that the isoquant of zs (•) is concave in the green pay­
m e n t s  s p a c e .  A l s o ,  a s  w e  m o v e  t o w a r d  t h e  n o r t h w e s t ,  i . e . ,  a s  0 ^ )  i n c r e a s e s  o r  t ( ( f > s ,  0 i )  
decreases, or both, the value of z$ (•) decreases. This is because for green payments satis-
fying (22), 3^5 = M»(*SA)) - A]PS1 < 0 and 5^ = My(*s.»i)) " A] > 
0, by the concavity of w(-). Thus the optimal green payments must be the closest to 
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t°. The tangent point in Figure 2 is the closest to t° in the feasible set and so it is the 
optimal point. • 
Proof for Remark 9 
Proof, (i) Since e**(0h) is independent of e**(0z) and t**{0{). We may split the problem 
i n t o  t w o  m a x i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m s ,  o n e  f o r  e * * ( # & ) ,  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  f o r  e * * ( 0 i )  a n d  t * ' ( 0 i ) ,  
is substituted by a function of £**(#/)). The maximization problem with respect 
to e**(9t) and is, 
max(7 (t(#z), e(0z); PSh) = [v{e(0i)) + tt ( e ( 0 t ) ;  0S, 0 h )  - A£(0Z)] g t  
e,t 
+  [—A ( t ( 0 i )  + 7r (e(0z); 0S, 5/,))] 9 h  
+  w  ( t ( 0 i )  +  7t ( e ( 0 i ) ;  05, 0 i ) )  P s i  +  w  ( t ( 0 t )  + tt (e(0z); 0S, ^ )) Psh-
By comparative statics, we have, 
de{0i) ÙetÙpt — ÛttÙeP 
dPsh \H\ 
(23) 
where f7. = 9Ù{mum) jj = jy = ac/(t(fl,),e(o,)) = aù{t{0,),e{ot)) 
wnere uet — de(0i)dt{et) > — apshat(0t) ' ty" — dt(e,)dt(»,) ' UeP — de(0,)apSh ' 
and |i/| = . From second order conditions, we know |i/| > 0. Substituting 
the derivatives into (23), and then simplifying, we obtain, 
SS = 7re (e**(0,); 0,0t) - 7re (e"(0z); 0, ^ ) x + w^Psz] > 0 
where w'Sh = wt(y*'{<t>s,0h)), = tytt(i/**(0s, 0,,)), ™'si = ^t(y**(0s, ^ /)), and = 
y«(î/"(0s,6z)). 
(ii) The definition of information rent is, /(e; 0) = tt (e; 0,9h) — tt (e; 0,0i). Then, 
dI^ = 7Te (e; 4>,0i)— 7Te (e; 0,9/,) > 0, because 7re6 = —ce» > 0. 
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(ill) Suppose, as Psh increases. increases or does not change. When Psh 
increases, Psi decreases by the same degree since the marginal distributions remain the 
same, in particular, Ps does not change. Thus, given that Oi) increases or does not 
change, we need w ' { y * * ( è s , 9 h ) )  to increase for (19a) to hold. However, when y **(<Ps^ i )  
increases or does not change, t/**(0s, 0/0 = #/)+ /(e; <j>) increases because of (ii), 
which in turn implies w'{y**{<j)s,6h)) decreases. Thus, y**{<Ps^ i )  must decrease. • 
108 
References 
[1] Babcock, Bruce A. "Positioning U.S. Agriculture for the Next Farm Bill", Presented 
at the American Farm Bureau Federation's convention and annual meeting, January 
8, 2001. 
[2] Babcock, Bruce A. "A Farm Policy Objective: the Search Goes On". Iowa Ag Re­
view, Fall 2000, Vol. 6 No.4, pp. 1-3. 
[3] Bourgeon, Jean-Mark and Robert G. Chambers. "Stop-and-Go Agricultural Poli­
cies". Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 82 (February 2000): 1-13. 
[4] Chambers, Robert. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms". Amer. J. 
Agr. Econ. 74 (August 1992): 646-53. 
[5] Claassen, R., L. Hansen, M. Peters, V. Breneman, M.Weinberg, A. Cattaneo, P. 
Feather, D. Gadsby, D. Hellerstein, J. Hopkins, P. Johnston, M. Morehart, and M. 
Smith. "Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads: Guideposts on a Changing 
Landscape," ERS/USDA, Agricultural Economic Report No. 794, January 2001. 
[6] Cox, Craig A., "New Authorities and Additional Funding Needed to Ensure Im­
proved Stewardship of Agricultural Resources", Presented at the conference, Fixing 
the Farm Bill, March 27, 2001, The National Press Club Washington, D C. 
[7] Heimlich, Ralph, E. and Roger Claassen. "Agricultural Conservation Policy at a 
Crossroads", Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, v27, nl (April 1998): 
95-107. 
109 
[8] Horan, Richard D., James S. Shortle, and David G. Abler. "Green Payments for 
Nonpoint Pollution Control'', Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 81 (Number 5, 1999): 1210-121. 
[9] Hueth, Brent. "The Goals of U.S. Agricultural Policy: A Mechanism Design Ap­
proach" . Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 82 (February 2000): 14-24. 
[10] Lynch, Sarah and Katherine R. Smith. "Lean, Mean and Green... Designing Farm 
Support Programs in a New Era ", Policy Studies Program Report No. 3, December 
1994, Henry A. Wallace Institute For Alternative Agriculture. 
[11] Potter, Clive. Against the Grain: Agri-environmental Reform in the United States 
and the European Union''', New York: CAB International, 1998. 
[12] Veneman, Ann M. Remarks at the Sparks Companies 9th Annual Food & Agri­
culture Policy Conference, April 17, 2001 Washington, D C., Release No 0065.01. 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/04/0065.htm, accessed on May 22, 2001. 
[13] Wu, Junjie and Bruce A. Babcock. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment 
Program under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Agricultural and Resource Eco­
nomics 20(2): 316-327. 
[14] Wu, Junjie and Bruce A. Babcock. "Contract Design for the Purchase of Envi­
ronmental Goods from Agriculture", Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 78 (November, 1996): 
935-945. 
110 
6 H » I 
H » 
6 
Figure 1 : Transfer optimization for 
given e(jf>H, 0, ) and e(0„, 0, ) large farmers 
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CHAPTER 5. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation includes three chapters that investigate the design of environmental 
incentives under dynamic behavior, asymmetric information and dual policy goals. First, 
I explore the incentive design for policies to sequester carbon in agricultural soils. Until 
policy mechanisms that appropriately incorporate the potentially temporary nature of 
sinks are developed, it is unlikely that agricultural sequestration will gain widespread 
acceptance. I introduce and discuss three such mechanisms, the PAYG System, the VLC 
System, and the CAA System. These mechanisms could be implemented in the context 
of either a private trading market or a government program (such as green payments), 
although we explain them in the context of a well-functioning external carbon market 
that determines the price of carbon abatement. 
Common to all three systems are the issues of effective monitoring and enforcement, 
agreement on a baseline for measurement, and potential leakage (i.e. substitution of 
emissions from one location to another). Despite these concerns, there is ample reason to 
be optimistic that effective market mechanisms or government programs can be devised 
to include agricultural soils in an effective greenhouse gas policy. 
The next chapter discusses the design of alternative bankable permit regimes. I find 
that the efficiency property of a bankable permit regime depends on the structure of 
uncertainty as well as the structure of benefit and damage functions of a pollutant. The 
more firms' abatement costs vary over time (i.e., have large variances), the more efficient 
a bankable permit regime tends to be. Moreover, negative correlations among shocks 
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over time favor the use of bankable permits, because there is potential for cost or benefit 
smoothing over time. Whether allowing banking is welfare improving largely depends on 
the slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal damage curves. Our results have very 
important implications for policy makers. It may be valuable to allow banking in some 
tradable emission permit programs. Whether intertemporal trading should be allowed 
depends on the particular pollutants—both how they affect firms' profits and the social 
damages. 
Further work on this topic may prove fruitful. If the regulator can adjust its rules 
when shocks are revealed more efficient designs should be possible. It may also be useful 
to investigate how firms' investment decisions are affected by a bankable permit system 
with non-unitary intertemporal trading ratios. Finally the exploration of multiplicative, 
instead of additive uncertainty, in the benefit functions may also yield additional insights. 
In chapter four, I investigate the design of green payments in the presence of dual 
policy goals. Ideally, green payments encourage more environmental services from more 
conservation efficient farmers and, at the same time, provides income support for those 
who really need it, i.e., low income farmers. I find that, under incomplete information 
and the infeasibility of directly targeting transfers to low income farmers, the extent to 
which green payments can realize these dual goals depends on the correlation between a 
farmers' income and her conservation efficiency. Empirical work that provides evidence 
on the magnitude of this correlation could provide further insight into the efficacy of 
green payments. 
